George Saltas v. David A. Affleck and Kenneth Butte : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
George Saltas v. David A. Affleck and Kenneth
Butte : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph T. Stewart, Gerald Irvine; attorneys for defendant and appellant, Kenneth Butte.
Harry G. Metos, Samuel Bernstein; attorneys for plaintiff and respondent, George Saltas.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Saltas v. Affleck, No. 6190 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/528
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE SALTAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business , 
under the name and style of D. 
A. AFFLECK GROCERY, 
Defendant, 
KENNETH BUTTE, 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
No. 6190 
Brief of Appellant, Kenneth Butte 
STATEMENT 
Spero Saltas, thirty-year old son of plaintiff and 
unmarried, died as B: result of an accident occurring about 
1:30 p. m. on the 27th day of January, 1938, at the 
intersection of Third A venue and K Street, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. This action was prosecuted by deceased's 
father to recover from appellant, Kenneth Butte, and his 
employer, David A. Affleck, damages alleged to have 
resulted from the negligence of the defendant. 
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The accident occurred near the center of the inter-
section of said named streets while deceased was pro-
ceeding north on K Street in a Ford V-8 automobile 
driven by Gerald A. Franz, and appellant, Kenneth 
Butte, was driving in a westerly direction on Third Ave-
nue in a delivery truck owned by David A. Affleck. 
To plaintiff's complaint, alleging the negligence of 
appellant, an answer (Dft. Ab. 9) was filed denying 
negligence and alleging that the proximate cause of the 
accident was the negligence of Gerald A. Franz in fail-
ing to yield the right of way to the automobile enter-
ing said intersection from the right, in driving at an ex-
cessive speed, in failing to keep his automobile under 
proper control, and in failing to observe the traffic upon 
the highway, and particularly the west-bound traffic 
at said intersection. 
Plaintiff had a number of children in addition to 
deceased, including Paul, age twenty-one, working for 
the Utah Copper at $3.00 a day; and Pete, age twenty, 
working for the B. & G. Railroad at $3.63 a day. Plain-
tiff himself earned $4.23 a day for twenty-two days a 
month, making total earnings to the family, not includ-
ing deceased's wages, of about $13.00 a day. (Dft. Ab. 
20, ?2-3) Deceased did not live at home all of the time, 
living a number of months at Cyprus Hall. (Dft. Ab. 83) 
How much, if anything, deceased contributed to plain-
tiff was very uncertain, as also was the question of the 
cause of the accident. 
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Upon the first trial a directed verdict (Pff. Ab. t 5-
16) was returned in favor of the defendant, David A. 
Affleck, for the reason that at the time of the accident. 
the appellant, Kenneth Butte, was operating the automo-
bile of his employer during his lunch period upon a frolic 
of his own, in violation of his employer's instructions, 
and not in furtherance of any business or purpose of his 
employer, having driven the truck a distance of approx-
imately ten blocks past the place where his employment 
took him and being then headed to a place an additional 
ten or tweh-e blocks further from any place where his 
employment might call him. 
The issues of linbility and damages were submitted 
to the jury as against the appellant, Kenneth Butte, and 
a unanimous verdict of $800.00 was returned by the 
jury. (Dft. Ab. 27) 
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, (Pff. Ab. 
16-18) claiming inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
A conditional order to increase the judgment to $2400.00 
or grant a new trial was made by the court. (Dft. Ab. 
28-9) Appellant filed a motion (Dft. Ab. 29) to set aside 
such conditional order, which motion was denied, (Dft. 
Ab. 30) and thereafter objected to a retrial of the ac-
tion (Dft. Ab. 31) for the reason and upon the ground 
that the order granting a new trial was improper and 
that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction and abused 
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any discretion that might exist, which objection was 
overruled. (Dft. Ab. 32-3) 
Upon a second trial as against appellant, Kenneth 
Butte only, wherein plaintiff premeditatively and im-
properly advised the jury of the existence of insurance, 
a verdict of $3,061.00 was returned and judgment en-
tered thereon. (Dft. Ab. 128) Appellant thereupon moved 
(Dft. Ab. 128) to set aside the second verdict and reinstate 
the first verdict of $800.00 which motion was denied, (Dft. 
Ab. 131) and filed his motion for a new trial, (Dft. Ah. 
129-130) which motion was also denied. (Dft. Ab. 131) 
ERRORS RELIED UPON 
The errors relied upon by appellant, Kenneth Butte, 
may be classified and discussed under the following 
general headings: 
I. That the court was without jurisdiction, or in 
any event was guilty of an abuse of discretion in grant-
ing plaintiff's motion for a new trial as against the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, erroneously refused to set aside 
the conditional order for a new trial, erroneously failed 
to set aside the second verdict and reinstate the first ver-
dict, and erroneously proceeded with the retrial of said 
action. (Assignments of Error 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24) 
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II. That upon the second trial, plaintiff's counsel 
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in deliberately con-
ducting his examination of the jurors in such a manner 
as to tell them, erroneously, that appellant, Kenneth 
Butte, was insured, in cross-examining the witness, Nor-
ma Chamberlain concerning an alleged statement given 
to "an adjuster for an insurance company," in making a 
closing argument to the jury wherein he stated in effect 
that an insurance adjuster or investigator was at the 
scene of the accident the day it occurred or soon there-
after, which statement was not supported by any evi-
dence, and then telling the jury that defendant's at-
torney spends all his time in the defense of this class 
(insurance cases) of cases. The court erred in not dis-
charging the jury as repeatedly requested by appellant's 
counsel. (Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
III. That the court erred in instructing the jury 
on the law of the case. (Assignments of Error 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11 and 12). 
IV. That the court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on appellant's theory and as requested by him. 
(Assignments of Error 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18). 
V. The court erred in erroneously permitting plain-
tiff's counsel to read from a deposition not offered or re-
ceived in evidence. (Assignment of Error 6). 
VI. Errors in rulings on admissibility of evidence, 
(Assignments of Error 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33). 
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VII. Error in denying appellant's motion for a new 
trial. (Assignment of Error 25). 
ARGUMENT 
The principal assignments of error relate 
1. To the granting of plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial. 
2. To the refusal to discharge the jury at the 
second trial on account of prejudicial and 
deliberate misconduct of plaintiff's counsel. 
3. Improper instructions given to the jury and 
proper instructions denied. 
4. Rulings on admissibility of evidence. 
IMPROPER GRANTING OF NEW TRIAL 
We particularly call attention to the fact that Sec-
tion 104-40-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, setting forth 
the grounds upon which a motion for a new trial rna y be 
granted does not provide that a new trial may be 
granted upon "INADEQUATE DAMAGES APPEARING TO 
HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION 
OR PREJUDICE," which was the sole basis for the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
granting of the new trial herein; that no showing of 
passion or prejudice was presented to the court and 
the court merely was "INCLINED TO THINK * * '~ THAT 
THE VERDICT WAS TOO LOW." (Dft. Ab. 28). In view 
of the extremely questionable case of liability, with 
clear and positive evidence that Gerald A. Franz 
was negligent. and unsatisfactory and purely speculative 
evidence of damage, it cannot be said that the $800.00 
unanimous verdict was such, without other showing, as 
to disclose that it was the result of passion and prejudice. 
"\Ye will not set forth the evidence in this brief as 
even a cursory reading of it will clearly show that the 
jury could well have found that the sole proximate canst:; 
of the accident was the negligence of Gerald A. Franz, 
the driver of the car in which deceased was riding, in 
not looking to his right until he "was practically in the 
center of the intersection" and "believed I could beat it 
across the intersection." (Dft. Ab. 1?) We will only men-
tion that said driver witness endeavored to have appel-
lant's truck driven one hundred to one hundred ten feet 
while the witness proceeded uphill "ten or twelve feet," 
(Dft. Ab. 18) at fifteen or twenty miles an hour, and 
taking all of the testimony into consideration, ample 
evidence was presented to show that had Gerald A. 
Franz made any observation whatsoever he would have 
seen the truck and could have stopped his automobile, 
at the speed he said he was traveling, before ever reach-
ing the south curbline of Third Avenue. These and other 
facts disclosed by the evidence are mentioned for the 
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sole purpose of advising the court that the jury was jus-
tified in taking into consideration the questionable 
liability in arriving at a verdict of $800.00. 
There is an even stronger justification for the 
$800.00 verdict. Plaintiff endeavored to claim that this 
thirty-year old son was his sole support. He testified, 
"Spero lived in my house. That is the only boy I had 
to help me. I was besides an old man, be sick, not do 
anything. He do for me. He was the only one that helped. 
I had four boys going to school, nobody else worked." 
(Dft. Ab. 19) On cross-examination, plaintiff testified, 
"I have worked in Bingham thirty years. I have worked 
regularly for that time except in 1936. I am working 
regularly now and worked regularly in 1937. My next 
boy is Paul. He works for the Utah Copper." (Dft. Ab. 
19) "He lives at home and helps me sometimes. Paul 
earns $5.00 a day. My next boy is Pete. Pete earns $3.65 
a day. I make $4.25 a day for twenty-two days a month. 
The total income for myself and two boys is about 
$13.00 a day, except when we are only working twenty-
two days a month. Spero told me and my wife that he 
would not get married until the other boys were old 
enough to step in and help." (Dft. Ab. 20). The other 
boys had stepped in more than a year prior to the date 
of the accident and had taken over Spero's responsibil-
ity. At least, the jury could have so found. The facts 
developed on the cross-examination of plaintiff showed 
two things, first, a willingness on plaintiff's part to fal-
sify the truth, and, second, that he was not financially 
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dependent upon his deceased son. as he tried at first 
to make appear. The jury may well have concluded that a 
little more of the truth as developed upon the second trial 
was the fact. Attention is called to the testimony of 
plaintiff upon the second trial, when he finally admitted 
that deceased had not lived at home as he had previous-
ly testified. but had lived for a number of months at 
Cyprus Hall. (Dft. Ab. 83). It is interesting to note that 
upon the second trial, plaintiff also admitted that Paul 
paid rent charged to him by the Utah Copper. (Dft. Ab. 
76-7?). There was no claim for special damages. Plain-
tiff was not impecunious or unemployed. Deceased was 
not his sole support. The jury could have found that the 
deceased, either while living away from home or at 
home, was not financially supporting the plaintiff, but 
that assistance of plaintiff had been taken over by Paul 
and Pete by reason of Spero's having previously carried 
his share of financial burden.· 
Certainly in view of the questionable liability, the 
facts testified to by plaintiff on the question of financial 
assistance, including his willingness to extend the truth, 
it was solely for the jury to determine the pecuniary 
loss, if any, suffered by plaintiff. The court had some 
kind of feeling or inclination that the verdict was too 
low and permitted such feeling to overrule the verdict of 
eight jurors, who had all the evidence before them, delib-
erated upon it, and concluded that plaintiff's pecuniary 
loss under all the circumstances was $800.00. 
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In considering the amount of this verdict, your at-
tention is also called to the result upon the second trial. 
The verdict was six to two, with two jurors holding out 
for no cause of action, clearly showing questionable lia-
bility. The affidavits in support of appellant's motion 
for a new trial after the second trial showed that one 
juror of the six returning a verdict was in favor of an 
$800.00 verdict, and even upon PLAINTIFF'S P R 0 0 F 
of insurance, and a statement by one juror in the jury 
room that he was in favor of sticking the insurance com-
pany, (Dft. Ah. 131) a verdict of only $3,061.00 was re-
turned. (Dft. Ab. 128). 
The situation is not unlike that in Hirabelli v. Daniels, 
44 Utah 88, 138 Pac. 11'72, which was an action of assault 
and battery, claiming $1,000.00 general damages, $50.00 
medical expense, $18.00 loss of wages, and $500.00 puni-
tive damages. Plaintiff's testimony was that besides re-
ceiving a rather severe injury, he lost $18.00 for one 
week's work and paid $50.00 for a doctor's hill. We are 
not concerned with the first trial of the case. Upon the 
second trial, a verdict was returned for $35.00 actual 
damages, consisting of $1.00 for pain and suffering, 
$22.00 for medical expense, and $12.00 loss of wages. 
There was conflicting testimony as to who was the 
aggressor in provoking the fight. The court granted. a 
third trial on the theory that the damages were inade-
quate and not in harmony with the evidence. A third 
trial resulted in a verdict for $119.00. The defendant 
then filed a motion to vacate the judgment and reinstate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
the $35.00 judgment, and, on the courfs refusal, to grant 
a new trial. This motion was denied. A proper record of 
the proceedings was preserved as in the instant case, 
and defendant appealed. On appeal the judgment was 
reversed with directions to reinstate the second judg-
ment on the grounds that "as to the amount of the dam-
ages, the court could not set up his mere opinion or 
judgment against that of the jury and grant a new 
trial, because he may have thought the evidence appar-
ently or fairly justified a larger verdict," and it could 
not he said that "the jury in rendering the verdict on the 
second trial * * * plainly disregarded or misapprehended 
the instructions or the evidence or acted upon the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice." The Hirahelli case is 
significant in its application to the instant case in that 
(1) a proper record of the proceedings having been pre-
served in the instant case, the improper granting of a 
new trial is reviewable, and (2) $i.OO general damages 
for pain and suffering and $22.00 for reasonable medical 
expenses, although $30.00 was actually paid, was held 
not so inadequate as to warrant interference with the 
verdict by the trial court, there being no fixed rule to 
measure the amount of damages for the pain suffered, 
and the question of damages is left to the sound discre-
tion of the jury. 
We present two matters for separate consideration, 
namely (1) that the verdict of $800.00 in this case, like 
in the Hirabelli case, was not so inadequate that the 
trial court could say it was rendered under misappre-
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hension or disregard of the court's instructions, or under 
the influence of passion or prejudice, and the court 
usurped the functions of the jury and was guilty of an 
abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff's motion; and 
(2) the court's order granting a new trial was void, being 
unauthorized by statute and an illegal invasion of the 
province of the jury. 
A. MEASURE OF DAJ\IAGES IN DEATH CASES 
An action for death differs materially from the 
ordinary common law action for personal injuries in that 
the measure of damages in each specific case is of neces-
sity highly speculative, uncertain and problematical, 
and the amount of damages is a question upon which 
reasonable men may differ. Recovery was unknown to 
the common law, and our statute, Section 104-3-11, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, similar to most death sta-
tutes, provides that "such damages may be given as under 
all the circumstances of the case may be just." Some 
states only allow as recoverable damages, loss of "finan-
cial services and assistance," disallowing loss of "society, 
comfort, and protection," and "mental anguish, suffering, 
and bereavement," as being too remote and speculative 
and incapable of reduction to a monetary equivalent by 
any accurate method or certain criteria. Other states 
allow one or both of the last mentioned elements of 
damage to be considered by the jury in rendering a ver-
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diet, notwithstanding the highly speculative nature 
thereof. Utah falls rather in a middle class, and the 
measure of damage is loss of "financial services and 
assistance" and loss measured by a pecuniary standard, 
if any, of "society. comfort, and protection." Nothing, 
however, is recoverable in Utah for "mental pain, suf-
fering and bereavement," which is too remote and sen-
timental to he a proper element of damage under the 
statute. Webb v. D. & R . G. W. R. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24 
Pac. 616. And loss of "society, comfort and protection" 
cannot he considered if the deceased was not living with. 
the beneficiaries. White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 Pac. 
441, Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction, 57 Utah 566, 196 
Pac. 556. Furthermore, any recovery must he for a 
pecuniary and not a sentimental loss. As stated in White 
v. Shipley, supra: 
"The law awards damages for loss of comfort, 
society and companionship only in a pecuniary 
sense and not as solatium. * * * The loss must he 
such that in contemplation of law it amounts to 
the deprivation of some service, attention, or care 
that has in it the element of pecuniary value." 
And in Poole v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 Utah 303, 
26 Pac. 654, it was said: 
"As the testimony did not show that there 
were heirs living who were pecuniarily injured by 
his death, no recovery should be had, as in that 
case, no one has sustained any pecuniary loss or 
injury by his death." 
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See also English v. Southern Pacific Company, 13 Utah 
40?, 45 Pac. 4?. The measure of damages is not the p~cun­
iary value of deceased's life, but rather the pecuniary 
loss suffered by the plaintiff. This is peculiarly a ques-
tion for the jury. 
In an annotation In L. R. A. 1916C at page 810, it 
is said that such damages 
"~': 1' ~·, are difficu It of precise proof and in a 
measure are uncertain and problematical, and 
what would be a proper compensation for the 
pecuniary injuries suffered must always, on such 
proof as can be made, be left to the sound judg-
ment of the jury. In assessing the damages in such 
cases, the jury are entitled to use their own ex-
perience and observation in connection with such 
light as the evidence may reflect upon the subject, 
and approximate as near as possible the pecuniary 
loss, for the matter is necessarily largely left to 
their sound sense, judg·ment, and discretion." 
On page 813, it is said: 
"Where the question is presented to the court 
as to whether or not it should interfere with the 
jury's verdict, its solution does not depend upon 
whether its judgment as to the amount of damages 
awarded coincides with that of the jury, and the 
mere fact that the court, had it been acting as a 
jury in the particular case, would have assessed 
the damages at a larger or smaller amount than 
did the jury, in and of itself, is no ground for 
interfering with the verdict of the jury. In other 
words, the court will not impose upon the parties 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
to the suit its judgment as to the proper amount 
of damages to be assessed, in the place of that of 
tht> jury, who are expressly authorized in that 
regard by the statute:· 
Where it can reasonably be found from the evidence 
that deceased might not have continued to contribute 
substantial sums of money to his next of kin, jury ver-
dicts from all jurisdictions ranging from several hun-
dred dollars down to nominal damages are held to be 
binding upon the Court, the jury being entitled to take 
into consideration the habits of the deceased in saving 
his money, the size of the estate he had acquired, if any, 
at the time of his death and that he might have acquired 
but for his death, the age of his dependents and the 
possibilities that they might soon be self-supporting, 
the fact that most or all of deceased's earnings were used 
up for his own expense and support, the fact that he 
might have been thrown out of employment at any 
time, and all of the other factors and uncertainties which 
go to make up or determine what the actual financial 
worth of deceased was to those suing for his death. 
In Anderson v. Chicago, (Neb.) 52 N. W. 840, a 
nominal verdict for $1.00 for the death of an unmarried 
adult brakeman was upheld as being sufficient against 
the contention that it was inadequate. The court said: 
"* * -:: The damages are not to be estimated 
by the value of the life lost, but such a sum as 
the proof shows will compensate the next of kin 
for the pecuniary injury which they have sustained 
by such death. * -:: * Deceased, at the time of his 
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death, was an unmarried adult. * * * There were 
surviving ~·, ~·, ~·, eleven brothers and sisters, all of 
whom but two had reached their majority, the 
most of whom were married. The deceased was 
addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, and 
was careless in his work. * ~·: ·J: He was receiving 
the sum of $45.00 per month. The testimony fails 
to show that he saved his earnings, or that he had 
been in the habit of making contributions for the 
maintenance and support of any of his brothers 
and sisters. -:: -;, * Under the proof they were war-
ranted in inferring that the next of kin were not 
pecuniarily injured by the death of the intestate; 
hence plaintiff was only entitled to recover nom-
inal damages." 
Nebraska, like Utah, allows the jury to consider loss of 
society and companionship in assessing the damage. Ensor 
v. Compton, (Neb.) 194 N. W. 458. 
In Barksdale v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., (S. C.) 56 
S. E. 906, a verdict for $1,000.00 for the death of an engin-
eer, was held not inadequate. South Carolina goes even 
further than Utah and most states, and permits the jury 
in assessing the damages to consider not only loss of 
society and companionship, but also mental anguish and 
suffering. Birchman v. Southern R. R., (S. Car.) 54 S. E. 
553. 
In Russell v. Taglialavore et al, (La.) 153 So. 44, a 
$500.00 verdict was held not inadequate where decedent 
left no children. The court said: 
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"Each case must depend upon its own pe-
culiar facts and circumstances. In the present 
case, we cannot conceive that plaintiff has suf-
fered damages for the negligent killing of his 
wife beyond a nominal amount. We think $500.00 
sufficient." 
Louisiana, like South Carolina, permits consideration of 
mental anguish and suffering of the heirs, and goes 
even further than South Carolina, allowing physical suf-
fering of deceased. Aymond v. JV estern Union Telegraph 
Co., {La.) 91 So. 671, and Reed v. Warren, (La.) 132 So. 250. 
In Foglia v. Pittsburgh, (Penn.} 179 Atl. 871, a ver-
dict for $500.00 was held to be adequate for the death 
of a boy who expected to be a laborer. The funeral ex-
penses amounted to $265.50. Pennsylvania like Utah, 
allows recovery for loss of society. Cokley v. Northern 
Penn. R. Co., (Pa.} 5 Clark 444. 
In Leahy v. Davis, (Mo.) 25 S. W. 941, a verdict of 
$175.00 for the death of a seventeen year old boy em-
ployed as a teamster was held to be not so inadequate 
as to warrant a new trial where the funeral expenses 
amounted to $55.00 less than the total amount of the 
verdict. We quote from the case: 
"* * * A new ~rial will not be granted on 
the sole ground of smallness of damages * * * 
There can be no invariable rule in a case like this. 
* * * When so much is left to the discretion and 
experience of the jury, the court should be very 
cautious in disturbing their ,judgment." 
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At the time of this decision, Missouri, like Utah, permitted 
the jury to consider loss of society and association. 
In Cuniffe's Exec. v. Johnson, (Ky.) 132 S. W. (2d) 
4?, a verdict of $500.00 was held not so inadequate as to 
be said to be the result of passion, prejudice, or mistake, 
where the action was brought by a sister and the de-
ceased had a life expectancy of 16.4 years and earned 
an average of $200.00 per month. The court pointed out 
that damages in a death case are not so easily ascer-
tainable as in a personal injury case, saying: 
"Necessarily, such damages are speculative. 
They depend on many unpredictable factors such 
as the length of time the decedent would have 
lived but for the accident, the probable condition 
of his health thereafter and his ability to work, 
retention of his employment, amount of his earn-
ings, and amoun.t saved out of his earnings. Many 
contingencies must be considered, and the jury 
has a wide field to explore in reaching its verdict. 
In a case of this kind it is impossible to say with 
any reasonable degree of certainty what the 
injury to the estate was. The answer rests on 
probabilities, and, at best, is a matter of con-
jecture. It may have been much or little, accord-
ing to the sequence of events, if the decedent had 
not been killed, which are unforeseeable." 
In Burke v. Arcata & ~f. R. R. Co., (Cal.) 5? Pac. 
1065, suit was brought by a sister and two brothers, all 
adults, for the death of the deceased, who was thirty-four 
years old, in good health, a competent and reliable loco-
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motive engineer, unmarried and boarding with one of his 
brothers immediately before the accident. and on friend-
ly terms with the plaintiffs. It was held reversible error 
to not submit a requested instruction limiting the damages 
to a nominal sum. The court among other things said: 
"In this country the ruling is nearly unani-
mous that the statute gives a cause of action, and, 
if no damages are proven, nominal damages only 
can be recovered. * * *Let us consider upon what 
a sea of uncertainty the jury must embark. (1) 
\Yould the deceased have had the health to work 
and accumulate, and would he have done so? He 
never has saved anything, and it does not appear 
that he could. (2) May he not have married, and 
have had children of his own, who would inherit? 
(3) ~fight he not by will have disinherited the 
plaintiffs. And (4) might he not have outlived 
them? The majority of men die without much 
property. \Vhether the deceased would have suc-
ceeded in accumulating, and, if he had been suc-
cessful, would have left it to plaintiffs, is matter 
of pure speculation. Such a guess as to probabil-
ities is not, according to settled rules and maxims 
of the law, proper ground for the award of dam-
ages. I see no reason why this class of cases should 
constitute an exception." 
In Vanek v. Chicago G. JV. R. Co., 252 Fed. 871, 
a verdict of $1.00 was upheld. The court said: 
"The deceased was of middle age, in robust 
health, in full possession of his sight and hear-
ing. * * * It is the settled rule of the Federal 
Courts that disputed questions of fact are to 
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be found by the jury, and such findings will 
not be disturbed by the court unless it was 
the result of passion, prejudice, or some mani-
fest misconduct. It cannot be said that this 
verdict of $1.00 under the circumstances of this 
case, indicates either passion, prejudice, or mis-
conduct on the part of the jury. * * * The evi-
dence would warrant a much larger verdict be-
yond a doubt. Indeed, it may be said that had 
the assessment been made by the court the re-
covery would have been considerably in excess 
of the sum awarded by the jury. But the ques-
tion of damages was for the jury. * * * The 
verdict should not be disturbed, even though the 
court may regard it as inadequate unless some-
thing is shown which indicates passion, prejudice, 
or corrupt motive, or that they made an import-
ant and manifest mistake." 
In DeLuna v. Union Railway Co. of New York City, 
114 N. Y. S. 893, a verdict of $189.?5, the exact amount 
of the funeral expenses, was ordered reinstated as not 
being inadequate. Deceased was thirty-two years of age, 
unmarried, leaving a brother and two married sisters. 
She had been employed as a seamstress at $9.00 a week, 
and was assistant to the foreman and in line for pro-
motion. She lived with plaintiff and plaintiff's husband 
and paid for her board. The court said that the damages 
are "limited to such a sum as the jury terms to be fair 
and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries sus-
tained by the persons for whose benefit the action is 
brought." The court further went on to say: 
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"Recognizing the general prospective and in-
definite character of these damages and the im-
possibility of a basis for accurate estimate it 
allows a jury to give what they shall deem a 
just compensation * * * the damages to the next 
of kin in that respect are necessarily indefinite, 
prospective, and contingent. They cannot be 
proved even with an approach to accuracy, and 
yet they are to be estimated and awarded, for the 
statute has so commanded. * * * Human lives 
are not all of the same value to survivors." 
In Swanton v. King, '72 App. Div. 5'78, '76 N. Y. S. 
528, a $600.00 verdict was held not inadequate as dam-
ages for the death of an unmarried man twenty-two 
years old, where the evidence showed that for twelve 
months prior to his death, while living with his father 
and mother, he had worked steadily for $9.00 per week, 
which he brought home to his mother, his next of kin 
being his father, mother, sister, and four brothers. 
In Rlwads v. Chicago & A. R. Co., (Ill.) 81 N. E. 
3'71, a verdict of $1.00 for the death of a lawyer was 
held to be not inadequate. The deceased was forty-eight 
years old, had an earning capacity of $10,000.00 per 
year, was unmarried and left surviving him a brother 
and three sisters. 
In Chesapeake Ohio & S. W. R. Co. v. Higgins, 
(Tenn.) 4 S. W. 4'7, deceased was a capable, skillful, and 
experienced locomotive engineer. A suit brought by his 
wife resulted in a verdict of $500.00. Upon motion a 
new trial was granted resulting in a $5,000.00 verdict. 
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On appeal the Supreme Court set aside the latter judg-
ment and entered judgment for $500.00, the original 
verdict, saying: "The verdict of the jury for $500.00 does 
not evince passion, prejudice, or corruption authorizing 
the court to set it aside." 
In Ratushny v. Punch et al, (Conn.) 138 Atl. 220, 
it was held that the trial court erred in setting aside a 
$1000.00 verdict for the death of a forty-nine year old 
foreman earning $42.00 per week where there was no 
passion or prejudice of the jury shown. The deceased 
was sober and industrious, in good bodily health, em-
ployed at $42.00 per week at Chase Metal works, where 
he had been for twenty years and had lost no time in 
that period. He was an expert drawer and for ten years 
had been subforeman, and during the last year had 
earned $2100.00 and his life expectancy was 21.95 years. 
The court said: 
"The question * ~" ~" is not whether this court 
or the trial court would have come to the same 
conclusion as the jury reached, but whether the 
jury was within its proper province * ~" ~". Such 
problems are peculiarly appropriate for a jury's 
deliberation. * 'i: * It is not to be overlooked that 
the pecuniary injuries resulting ~" ~" ~" are difficult 
of precise proof and in a measure are uncertain 
and problematical. In assessing damages in such 
cases, the jury are entitled to use their own ex-
perience and observation in connection with such 
light as the evidence may reflect upon the subJect 
and approximate as near as possible the pecuniary 
loss, for the matter is necessarily largely left to 
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was no certainty of future earnings. of work. of 
health, or even life, and this was a fact to be 
considered. All these uncertainities made the ques-
ti 
,. 
on. 
In the following cases the verdicts indicated were 
all held not inadequate: Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. 
v. JVilliams, (Ky.) 200 S. W. 451, $1,000.00 for the death 
of a bus driver; JVilkin's Admin. v. Hopkins, (Ky.) 128 
S. W. (2d) 7"!2, $500.00 for the death of an elderly man 
earning $5.94 a day and with a life expectancy o( ?.4 
years; 1llulchahey v. JVashburn Car Wheel Co., (Mass.) 
14 N. E. 106, $1.00 for the death of a machinist; Price v. 
Glynea & C. Coal & Brick Co., 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 
12?8-C. A., 225 pounds for the death of a miner, leav-
ing surviving him a widow and a twenty-eight year 
old daughter; Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (S. 
Dak.) 62 N. W. 96?, $1.00 for an adult child where the 
father was left surviving; Powell v. Canadian P. R. Co., 
? Sask. L. R. 43, $1,000.00 for a car repairman, thirty-six 
years of age, unmarried, and earning $?5.00 per month, 
Jeaving surviving his mother, who was seventy-one years 
and receiving about ten shillings a week from deceased; 
Howard v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 40 Fed. 195, $1.00 
for a thirty-seven year old trackman on a railroad, leav-
ing surviving three brothers and two sisters, no wife, 
children, or parents; Haley v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 'Z' Baxt. 
(Tenn.) 239, $5.00; Such v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co., 
2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 353, $150.00 where defendant's lia-
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hility was questionable; Schnable v. Providence Public 
Market, (R. I.) 53 Atl. 634, $750.00 for a five year old 
hoy; Kinser v. Soap Creek Coal Co., (Iowa) 51 N. W. 1151, 
$300.00 for a young man twenty years of age, strong, 
healthy, intelligent, industrious, and saving; Snyder v. 
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., (Mich.) 91 N. W. 643, $250.00 
for a twelve year old hoy attending school and in addi· 
tion assisting at home; Gubbitosi v. Rothschilds, 78 N. Y. 
S. 286, $200.00 for a six year old hoy; Overholt v. Vieths, 
(Mo.) 6 S. W. 74, $10.00; Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 
(Ind.) 153 N. E. 507, $1.00; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. 
1-Veber, (Kan.) 6 Pac. 877, nominal damages; Hartsell v. 
Harris, (N. C.) 178 S. E. 120, $1,000.00 for a twenty-four 
year old woman employed in a hosiery mill and earning 
$15.00 per week; Purnell v. R. Co., (N. C.) 130 S. E. 313, 
$1,000.00 for a ten year old hoy of bright mind, good 
health, habits and character, and a fine physique. 
In Webb v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24 Pac. 
616, it was said: 
"The damages, the pecuniary injury in cases 
under this statute, cannot he proved with even an 
approach to accuracy, and yet they are to he 
estimated and awarded, for the statute has so 
commanded and the jury is to give such damages 
as may he just under all the circumstances." 
In the instant case, plaintiff's pecuniary loss on 
account of the death of his son is purely speculative for 
the following reasons: 
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(a) Deceased was unmarried and left no family 
of his own. 
(h) Plaintiff admitted his deceased son had agreed 
to assist him only until the next older boys were work-
ing, and such boys had been working for nearly a year, 
and, with himself, were earning between $13.00 and 
$15.00 per day. It is not likely this one son would 
continue to contribute to the support of his family in-
definitely when other members of the family had taken 
over the burden. 
(c) Deceased had indicated he would not get mar-
ried until the other boys were old enough to step in and 
help, and as they were then helping, the assumption 
would he that deceased would have married and ac-
quired responsibilities of his own. 
(d) Plaintiff had other childen living with and 
aiding him, who would more or less take the place of the 
son lost through the accident. 
(e) Deceased had been living away from home 
at Cyprus Hall for a number of months. 
(f) Plaintiff did not by his complaint assert any 
claim for special damages. 
(g) Up to the time of his death, deceased had not 
acquired an estate, and the probabilities were that he 
never would have acquired anything substantial. 
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(h) Living and other expenses of deceased would 
probably have taken substantially all his future earnings. 
(i) How long deceased would have lived or been 
employed or helped plaintiff would be pure speculation. 
(j) Plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything 
for solace to his feelings, sorrow or other losses not 
measurable in money. 
(k) Because of plaintiff's apparent willingness to 
falsify the truth on certain matters relating to damage, 
the jurors may have been convinced that plaintiff was 
suffering mostly from an itching palm. 
Under these circumstances, the jury evidently con-
cluded that the pecuniary loss suffered by plaintiff was 
not substantial. Under our practice, particularly where 
a plaintiff demands a trial by jury, he submits all ques-
tions of fact, including the question of damage to the 
sound judgment and discretion of the jury, and is bound 
by the verdict returned by it. He is not entitled to have 
that verdict set aside merely because he is dissatisfied 
with the amount or the court has a feeling it is not 
enough. The matter of damages in this case was fairly 
presented to the jury under proper instructions, not ob-
jected to by defendant, and their unanimous verdict 
was $800.00. Much smaller amounts have been held not 
inadequate. There was absolutely no showing of dis· 
regard or misapprehension of the instructions given by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
the court or that the jurors acted under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. The evidence sustained the ver-
dict, and the court was not entitled to set up its opinion 
or judgment against that of the jury, merely because he 
thought the verdict small or that the evidence may have 
justified a larger verdict. As was done in the Hirabelli 
case, the verdict rendered on the first trial should be 
reinstated. 
B. THE ORDER MADE BY THE COURT WAS VOID 
Let us now consider the validity or invalidity of the 
order as made by the court. We have pointed out that 
the Utah Statutes make no provision for the granting 
of a new trial upon "inadequate damages," and although 
Section 104-40-7 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides, 
"A verdict of jury may also be vacated and a new trial 
granted by the court * * * when there has been a plain 
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the Court, 
or the evidence in the case, as to satisfy the court that 
the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of 
such instructions or under the influence of passion or 
prejudice." The order of the trial court was not and 
could not he made under this statute because: 
(1) There was no showing that there had been a 
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the 
court or the evidence in the case as to show the verdict 
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was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice, 
and 
(2) The court ordered the verdict increased to 
$2400.00 or a new trial granted, thus setting up its own 
verdict in place of the jury's. 
This is not the same as an order reducing an exces-
sive verdict to a lower figure, a practice sometimes in-
dulged in, because in such case the jury has already 
found the reduced sum owing and more, but when the 
verdict is increased by the court the jury has never 
rendered a verdict against the defendant for such an 
amount. The order as made required defendant to pay 
$2400.00 or submit to a new trial. In effect, the court 
said: "You must find more than $2400.00 damage." We 
have cited numerous cases holding damages much less 
than $800.00, and even nominal damages, as not being 
inadequate. The court's action was most certainly an 
unlawful usurpation of the province of the jury and inter-
ference with the right of trial by jury and was void. 
We submit for separate consideration: 
(1) That the verdict of $800.00 plus costs in this 
case was not so inadequate that the court could say 
it was rendered under a misapprehension or disregard 
of the court's instructions or under the influence of pas-
sion or prejudice, and 
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(2) The court's order granting a new trial was void, 
being unauthorized by statute. and an illegal invasion of 
the province of the jury. 
EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE INDEMNIFICATION 
This court is not concerned as to whether appellant, 
Kenneth Butte, is, or is not insured, hut under the form of 
policy issued in this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, under similar facts, has held that insurance protec-
tion is not extended to the driver of the car. See Laroche v. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (Penn.) 7 Atl. (2d) 
361. We mention this only because if the question of in-
surance influenced the jury, it may well be that Ken-
neth Butte will suffer the consequences of a verdict 
resulting from a grossly unfair trial. Whether Kenneth 
Butte or an insurance company pays a verdict, if such 
verdict results from improper evidence or the injection 
of improper elements into,a case, there has been a failure 
in the administration of justice. 
A reference to Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
and the record in the transcript and the abstract shows 
a deliberate intention prior to the examination of the 
jurors to "tell" the jury of the existence of liability 
insurance. (Dft. Ab. 34-35) Then followed a systematic 
and conscientious fulfillment of that intention in ques-
tioning each and every one of the fourteen jurors con-
cerning insurance, after the court by a proper examina-
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tion had substantially eliminated the possibility of any 
of the jurors, with one exception, having any con-
nection with an insurance company. (Dft. Ab. 35-41). 
Appellant's counsel then clearly presented to the 
court the deliberately planned and systematically car .. 
ried out purpose of plaintiff's counsel and moved for 
a discharge of the jury, (Dft. Ab. 42-44), but counsel 
for plaintiff was not satisfied that the jury fully under-
stood his wishes, and during the trial in examining Norma 
Chamberlain, a witness for defendant (Dft. Ab. 96-97), 
he asked her if she "gave a statement to a man by the 
name of Parkinson, who is an adjuster of an insurance 
company?" The record clearly shows that this was not 
done in good faith for the purpose of eliciting any in-
formation, because when such statement was offered 
to counsel, he declined to use it, and after the damage 
was done in asking the question, he withdrew the ques-
tion. 
In conducting his examination of the jurors and the 
question asked Norma Chamberlain, counsel was guilty 
of prejudicial and deliberate misconduct, but this still 
did not satisfy him for he then went entirely outside 
the record in his closing argument to the jury and stated, 
"that on the day of the accident or soon thereafter an 
investigator or adjuster was out at the scene of the acci-
dent," (Dft. Ab. 123-124) and still not being satisfied, he 
endeavored to tell the jury that the appellant was being 
defended by an insurance company through its counsel, 
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by stating "that the defendant secured an attorney who 
spends all his time in the defense of this class of ca~es." 
(Dft. Ah. 123). 
In addition to moving for a discharge of the jury 
at the close of the examination of the jury and before 
the introduction of evidence (Dft. Ab. 42), appellant 
renewed such motion before the case was submitted to 
the jury (Dft. Ah. 111). Appellant also presented affi-
davits in support of his motion for a new trial, showing 
that the question of insurance has been discussed in the 
jury room and that one of the jurors had stated he was 
in favor of ••sticking an insurance company." These 
affidavits are a part of the record. (Dft. Ab. 131) 
AUTHORITIES 
In presenting this matter, we are fully conscious of 
the rule in this jurisdiction and others that when the 
defendant has liability insurance jurors may be exam-
ined on voir dire appropriately in good faith concern-
ing their connection with insurance companies, for the 
purpose of determining their possible prejudice against 
plaintiff's cause. Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac. 
(2d) 224. This is a qualified privilege, however, and 
counsel must proceed in the utmost good faith and for 
the sole purpose of determining the bias or prejudice of 
jurors, and any attempt to bring insurance before the 
jury to impress upon them the fact that defendant is 
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indemnified is misconduct and grounds for a new trial 
I Ppeal AFTER THE JURY IS QUALIFIED or reversa on a . 
AND THE CASE PROCEEDS TO TRIAL, THERE IS THEN 
ABSOLUTELY NO CAUSE FOR INJECTION OF "INSURANCE" 
JNTO THE CASE AND ANY REFERENCE THERETO DIRECTLY 
OR INDIRECTLY IS CAUSE FOR A MISTRIAL, and this 
applies equally to questions and answers of witnesses 
or to argument and suggestion in the presence of the 
jury. There are exceptions, yes, but these exceptions are 
well defined and may be summarized as follows: 
(1) where the fact is a necessary incident to some ma-
terial and proper fact in the case (as in Reid v. Owens' 
(Utah) 93 Pac. (2d) 680, where the reference to insur-
ance was a part of an admission of liability or respon-
sibility which was proved, and perhaps provable only 
by the admissions of the defendant, W. F. Owens, and 
the allusion to insurance was so freighted with the ad-
mission that it could not be separated.); (2) if the in-
terest of a witness can only be shown by such reference 
(as where an agent or doctor employed by the insurance 
company is called as a witness); (3) where the matter 
comes out through inadvertence as by an unintentional 
and unresponsive answer. (This can hardly be classified 
as an exception, but the courts sometimes hold a mis-
trial will not be granted if the trial court promptly 
handles the situation by instruction or otherwise and it 
appears there was no prejudice.); (4) where the insurance 
company is a party to the suit. Otherwise any matter 
suggestive of insurance injected into the case during the 
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r- trial is considered misconduct, as depriving the defendant 
of a fair trial, and constitutes reversible error. 
A. EXAMINATION OF JURORS 
It is significant that defendant in examining the 
prospective jurors on voir dire did not pursue a method 
least suggestive of insurance. In Balle v. Smith, this 
court suggested a procedure sufficient for any proper 
purpose. It said: 
.. The examination must be in good faith 
and precaution taken to ask the questions in such 
manner as will not convey the impression that 
the defendant is in fact insured. It would be mis-
conduct on the part of counsel for plaintiff in 
such actions to so frame his questions that they go 
beyond what is reasonably necessary to serve the 
legitimate purpose of eliciting the fact he is en-
titled to adduce in order to secure a jury free 
from bias and prejudice. Daniel v. Asbill, 9? 
Cal App. ?31, 2?6 P. 149. The Supreme Court 
of Michigan in Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 
18?, 236 N. W. 222, 224, has suggested a method 
of conducting the examination of jurors relative 
to the matter of insurance which we approve as 
sufficient and proper to give plaintiff the informa-
tion to which he is entitled and at the same time 
protect defendant from prejudice. Such a method 
of examination might well be followed by counsel 
seeking to elicit such information, or by the trial 
judge. It is there said: 
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•• 'We also might suggest to the trial judges 
who so frequently examine the jury on the voir 
dire that they might make a brief statement call-
ing attention to the fact that some automobile 
drivers do, and others do not, carry insurance; 
that under no circumstances should it make any 
difference whatever as to the outcome of the case 
whether such insurance is carried or not; that 
the judge asks the question about to be put in 
every negligence case, and that he does not know, 
nor does the asking of the question signify, 
whether defendant carried insurance; that the law 
does not permit any further reference to be made 
to the subject during the trial of the case, but 
that the plaintiff has a right to know whether 
any of the members of the jury are officers, em-
ployees, or stockholders in any insurance company 
or members of any mutual insurance company. 
If, after asking the question, the answer is in the 
affirmative, further questions may follow and 
challenges made, if desired. If it is in the nega-
tive, the question is disposed of with finality. 
Such an action on the part of the trial judges 
should result in the further exclusion of all refer-
ence to insurance under penalty of a reversal of 
the case, should counsel persist in again purposely 
referring to it. * * * As a rule, there is no neces-
sity of naming an insurance company.', 
Other courts have prescribed similar procedure. In 
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (S. Ct. of Neb.) 268 N. W. 459, 
where a judgment was reversed because of improper 
examination of jurors, it was said: 
"To say that such interrogation in this case 
was made to secure information for use in the 
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exercise of challenges is not worthy of belief. 
To allow such an interrogation in all cases be-
cause it might in some cases have a legitimate use 
is to allow the unscrupulous and unethical to use 
it under a false guise for a purpose that no ethical 
lawyer would desire to attain. The pernicious, 
unethical purpose for which an unrestricted right 
to such an interrogation on voir dire may be used 
is such that restriction is necessary to an attain-
ment of a proper consideration of issues in actions 
tried to juries. To deny such a right entirely would 
work far less perversion of proper verdicts than 
does its unrestricted use. 
'"We feel that if such an interrogation is made 
at all, it should only be made when its legitimate 
purpose cannot be otherwise attained. We there-
fore hold that, upon the voir dire examination of 
jurors in a trial to a jury of an action for damages 
alleged to have arisen from negligence, counsel 
should scrupulously avoid any act, statement or 
question of such a nature as will reasonably 
inform the jury as to whether or not the defendant 
is indemnified by one not a party to the action 
against having to pay any verdict the jury may 
render against him. * * * To ask of the juror 
whether or not he is an agent of or ,gfockholder 
in any corporation and, if he says he is either, lo 
make inquiry of him as to the kind of corporation 
lo which he bears such relation will usually give 
all information needed without use of the word 
'insurance.' This method of inquiry was suggested 
in Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., supra." 
In Avery v. Collins, (Miss.) 157 S. 695, it was said: 
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"The proper means of ascertaining the quali-
fications of a tendered juror in respect to his in-
surance connections is to ask him what business 
he is engaged in and if the answer is, for instance, 
that he is a farmer, then the further precaution-
ary question may be put to him whether he had 
any other business or business connections, and, 
if he answers that he has not, that usually ought 
to end the privilege so far as inquiry into his 
insurance connections are concerned." 
To the same effect see Holman v. Cole, (Mich.) 218 
N. W. 795. 
Oklahoma prescribes a similar procedure stated 
in Safeway Cab Service Company v. Miner, 70 Pac. (2d) 
76 at page 78. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's counsel in examin-
ing each and every juror, even the widow of Tommy 
Williams, County Building elevator operator, and after 
learning the business and business connections of each 
juror and the improbability of their having any con-
nection with the Seattle insurance company, asked them 
if they were stockholders, officers or employees of the 
Northwest Casualty Company of Seattle, Washington. 
Such examination was made of housewives, a musician, 
a tailor, a contractor, a store clerk, a food products dis-
trict manager, and others solely for the purpose of em-
phasizing the insurance question. (Dft. Ab. 33-44, Dft. 
Tr. 19-35). 
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In Alexiou v. Nockas, (Wash.) 17 Pac. (2d) 911, it 
was said: 
"(14) The examination of the jurors by re-
spondent's counsel constituted reversible error. 
'Ve cannot countenance such inappreciation of the 
ethics as counsel manifested.· The purpose of his 
question was, patently, to inform the jury that 
the loss would fall upon an insurance company 
instead of the appellant." 
In .~.Hiller v. Kooker, (Iowa) 224 N. W. 46, similar 
procedure was held to be reversible error when the 
prospective jurors consisted largely of farmers and farm 
wives. The court said that "the references to the matter 
of liability insurance were prejudicial misconduct, not 
cured by the plaintiff's disclaimers or the court's in-
structions." 
In Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 667, where 
eight of the jurors were farmers and had been all of 
their lives, three were housewives, one of which was 
retired and another the wife of a common laborer, in 
reversing the judgment, the court said: 
"It would not be fair to learned and dis-
tinguished counsel who tried the case for the 
plaintiff to assume that they really suspected 
that the farm and laboring men who were being 
examined on voir dire were stockholders in the 
Great Western Casualty Company of Ft. Scott, 
Kansas, or any other or similar organization." 
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In Purcell v. Degenhardt, 202 Ill. App. 611, it was 
held that there was no occasion to ask a talesman and a 
groceryman if they were interested in any insuran_ce or 
casualty company doing liability business. 
Reference to insurance after the jury is qualified 
and during the course of the trial is strongly indicative of 
counsel's bad faith in examining the jurors on voir dire. 
In Helton v. Prater's Admin., (Ky.) 114 S. W. (2d) 
1120, where the examination of the jurors had been 
similar to that in the instant case and counsel made 
reference to insurance on his own car in his closing 
argument, in reversing the judgment the court said: 
"We seriously question the sufficiency of 
the showing made by plaintiff's attorney to show 
his good faith and to authorize the interrogation 
of the jurors on the question of insurance, but 
when in his closing argument to the jury he made 
the uncalled-for and unnecessary statement con-
cerning insurance, the real purpose of the voir 
dire examination was disclosed. * * * The defend-
ant moved to discharge the jury and continue the 
case, and his motion should have been sustained. 
On another trial, all references to insurance should 
scrupulously be kept from the jury and inter-
rogation of prospective jurors on voir dire con-
cerning insurance should not be permitted unless 
a satisfactory showing is made that one or more 
of the jurors maybe connected with or interested 
in the company in which the defendant was in-
sured, thus furnishing some reasonable basis for 
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the interrogator's claim of good faith. * * * Usually 
a method of inquiry can be adopted which will 
elicit the information sought without conveying 
to the jury the information that defendant carried 
insurance." 
In Volkmann v. Brosm.an, 129 Ill. App. 182, it was 
said that the purpose of the voir dire examination sug-
gesting insurance "was made obvious in the course of 
the trial." 
See also Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) supra, and 
Harris v. Elliot (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089. 
In the following cases, misconduct of counsel on 
voir dire examination, either alone, or coupled with sub-
sequent misconduct required a reversal, the error being 
incurable by instruction to the jury. 
Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Morrison, (Ariz.) 224 
Pac. 822; 
Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co., (Cal.) 
183 Pac. 171; 
Pickwick Stage Lines Inc. v. Edwards, (10th 
C. C. A.) 64 Fed. (2d) 758; 
Stewart v. Brune, (8th C. C. A.) 179 Fed. 350; 
Eckhart & Swan Milling Co. v. Schaefer's Admin., 
101 Ill App. 500; 
G. A. Fuller Co. v. Darragh, 101 Ill. App. 664; 
Volkmann v. Brossman, 129 Ill. App. 182; 
Crowley v. Stresenreuter, 174 Ill. App. 538; 
Purcell v. Degenhardt, 202 Ill. App. 611; 
Bunch v. Abbott, 256 Ill. App. 33; 
Mithen v. jeffrey, (Ill.) 102 N. E. 778; 
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Martin v. Lilley, (Ind.) 121 N. E. 443; 
Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 66'7; 
Miller v. Kooker, (Iowa) 224 N. W. 46; 
W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson's Admin., 
(Ky.) 162 S. W. 1139; 
Helton v. Prater's Admin. (Ky.) 114 S. W. (2d.) 
1120; 
]anse v. Haywood, (Mich.) 259 N. W. 34'7; 
Holman v. Cole, (Mich.) 218 N. W. '795; 
Pettit v. Goetz Sales Co., (Mo.) 281 S. W. 9'73; 
Chambers v. Kennedy, (Mo.) 2'74 S. W. '726; 
Wilson v. Thurston, (Mont.) 26'7 Pac. 801; 
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) 268 N. W. 459; 
Lassig v. Barsky, 8'7 N. Y. S. 425; 
Rothenberg v. Collins, 146 N.Y. S. '762; 
Lipshutz v. Ross, 84 N. Y. S. 632; 
Chernick v. Independent American Ice Cream Co., 
121 N. Y. S. 352; 
Gebo v. Findlay, 11 N. Y. S. 950; 
Hoge v. Soissions, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 860; 
Berry v. Park, (Okla.) 90 Pac. (2d) 425; 
Harris v. Elliott, (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089; 
Alexiou v. Nockas, (Wash.) 1'7 Pac. (2d) 911; 
Lucchesi v. Reynolds, (Wash.) 216 Pac. 12; 
Adams v. The Cline Ice Cream Co., (W. Va.) 131 
S. E. 86'7. 
When the case of Balle v. Smith was before this 
court, it is apparent a warning was issued to trial coun-
sel to proceed fairly and cautiously in ascertaining the 
possible bias of jurors. A suggestive procedure was out-
lined. The case was one of first impression and, undoubt-
edly, the court hesitated under the circumstances to say 
the conduct was deliberate. Counsel have generally 
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heeded these words of caution, but certainly the time 
and circumstances shown by the record in this case 
justify more than another caution, in fact, a condemna-
tion of inexcusable and deliberate misconduct. 
Cases should be tried upon facts and the law applic-
able, not upon an appeal to bias, prejudice, or ignorance. 
A small verdict on the first trial and two jurors holding 
out for no cause of action on the second trial justify a 
conclusion that the jurors were not satisfied either on 
the question of liability or damages. If prejudicial mis-
conduct was ever resorted to in an effort to secure an 
unjustified verdict, it is disclosed by the record in this 
case. 
B. QUESTIONING WITNESSES 
Wholly aside from any issue in the case, counsel 
boldly asked the witness, Norma Chamberlain, if she 
"gave a statement to a man by the name of Parkinson, 
who is an adjuster for an insurance company?" Thi~ 
was misconduct sufficient in and of itself to require 
a reversal of the judgment. (Dft. Ab. 96) 
Attention is here called to the case of Berry v. Park, 
(Okla.) 90 Pac. (2d) 425, in which the matter came up on 
voir dire examination of the jurors rather than during 
the course of the trial, but the language used is so 
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much like that in the instant case, we feel it merits 
comment here. During such examination, the following 
question was asked: "Do you know Mr. Crowe, the 
adjuster for Mr. Berry, setting over there, the man from 
Oklahoma City?" In reversing the judgment, the court 
had this to say: 
"The word 'adjuster' has been so closely as-
sociated with the term 'insurance' in the investi-
gation and trial or settlement of claims arising out 
of automobile accidents during recent years that 
in common parlance or usage and in the minds of 
the public generally it has become synonymous 
with or an abbreviated way of referring to an 
'insurance adjuster.' * ~~ ~~ Because of this current 
common knowledge, the slightest intimation under 
certain circumstances is all that is necessary to 
transform a suspicion into an actual belief or con-
viction in the minds of present day jurors that a 
defendant is insured. For the foregoing reasons, 
we cannot bring ourselves to the conclusion that 
counsels' use of the word in question is 'too remote 
and too far-fetched to attribute to it' any 'pernici-
ous effect' as we said of the use of the same word in 
Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okl. 2?3, 292 P. 356, 361, ?1 
A. L. R. 1 ?9. * * * In his brief, said counsel argues 
that his use of the term 'adjuster' in referring to 
Mr. Crowe effected no further implications than 
that Crowe was an 'agent' for the defendant. In 
our opinion such an assertion merely begs the ques-
tion and makes one wonder why then did counsel 
not use the word 'agent' instead of a term as sug-
gestive as 'adjuster.' * * ~~ We hold that the ques-
tion propounded to the jury by the plaintiff's coun-
sel on voir dire examination, which constitutes the 
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error discussed in the defendant's first proposi-
tion, was prejudicial and ground for reversal. 
In Consolidated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66 
Pac. (2d) 246, on cross examination of one of the defend-
ants, plaintiff's counsel concerning a statement, asked, 
"Who did you make it to?" The answer, "A lawyer for 
the insurance company, at that time, Charlie Young." In 
reversing the case, the court said: 
"It will he seen that the rule laid down by 
us is, that unless it appears that the plaintiff was 
entirely without blame in creating the situation 
which caused the reference to the question of in-
surance, we have always reversed the case when-
ever the matter was in any way brought to the at-
tention of the jury, regardless of whether it came 
through a witness for plaintiff or defendant, or 
upon direct or cross-examination. It is not suffici-
ent that plaintiff did not mean to bring out the 
prohibited matter, hut he must mean not to. 
"It is evident from the cross-examination, 
which referred to a specific signed statement 
made at a certain time, that counsel for plaintiff 
had in mind one particular statement of which 
he had knowledge. We are of the opinion that 
since this must have been true, it was the duty 
of counsel, even if the statement itself might be 
admissible for any purpose, to so carefully guard 
the manner in which it was introduced as to, if 
possible, avoid any reference to the insurance 
company. This he might easily have done by issu-
ing a subpoena duces tecum to the person to whom 
he knew it was made, and then, since it was a 
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signed and written statement, identifying it 
through the testimony of the defendant, and if 
it in any particular thereof was admissible, of-
fering or using it in evidence. He chose not to do 
this but went into the matter in such a manner 
that he should have known it was hut natural for 
the question of insurance to come out during the 
cross-examination. * * * In view of what we have 
said as to the highly prejudicial effect of allow-
ing a jury even to surmise from statements made 
during the trial that hack of the nominal defend-
ants there stands an insurance company, and the 
great care which a plaintiff must use to see 
that the matter does not come into the case through 
any fault of his, we are of the opinion that the 
case must be reversed for a new trial on this 
ground, regardless of the other assignments of 
error." 
Bluebar Taxi Cab & Transfer Company v. Hudspeth, 
216 Pac. 246, and Fike v. Grant, 8 Pac. (2d) 242, both from 
the State of Arizona, are to the same effect. 
Ward et al v. Haralson et al, (Ark.) 120 S. W. (2d) 
322; 
"(5) There is one other matter we feel con-
strained to mention which would call for a re· 
versal of the judgment even though the record 
was otherwise free from error. In the cross-exam-
ination of appellants' witness, Bowden, by one 
of counsel for appellees, this occurred: 'Q. You 
went out there, representing the State of Arkan-
sas, representing the defendants and an insurance 
company, and made those measurements?' to 
which objection was made, and the court said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
'That is improper and you better not make any 
other remarks like that.' An exception was takl•n 
and counsel asked for a mistrial on those remarks. 
to which the court replied: 'If he does it again I 
will grant a new trial.' 
I 
"The statement of counsel for appellees, in-· 
jecting into the case the fact, if it be a fact, that 
appellants had insurance coverage, was wholly 
inexcusable, uncalled for by anything that had 
previously occurred in the case, and was highly 
prejudicial. We think the remarks of the court 
were not sufficient to remove the prejudice and 
that a mistrial should have been declared. The 
obvious and only purpose in making the state-
ment was to advise the jury that an insurance 
company would have to pay any judgment ren-
dered. This was error." 
In Peay v. Panich, (Ark.) 8? S. W. (2d) 23, it was 
asked: "Q. Mr. Henson has shown you a statement you 
signed that was made before an insurance adjuster, who 
called on you shortly after the accident? Mr. Henson: 
'Defendant objects to the question as being prejudicial 
and asks the court to declare a mistrial.' " Although the 
trial court admonished the jury, the appellate court held 
that there was reversible error and the prejudice was 
not removed. 
In Poland v. Dunbar, (Maine) 25? Atl. 381, counsel 
for the defense had introduced without objection a state-
ment of the plaintiff unfavorable to her case. On cross-
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examination, plaintiff's counsel after having plaintiff 
identify her signature asked: "'After the statement was 
made and signed, did you then learn who this man repre-
sented?' A. 'I did.' Q. 'And whom did he represent?'" 
and over defendant's objection, she answered, "'The in-
surance company.'" The court held this reversible error. 
In Simpson v. Foundation Company, (N. Y.) 95 
N. E. 10, there was reversible error where it was brought 
out in the evidence that certain statements had been 
made and conversations had with employees of a certain 
insurance company. 
In Manigold v. Black River Traction Company, 80 
N. Y. S. 861, the question was asked: "Didn't Dr. Rock-
well go there to try and settle with Manigold, and wasn't 
he representing the insurance company back of this 
company?" The court said: 
"In order to protect the defendant, its coun-
sel was forced to object to the question and yet 
by doing so, he in effect admitted the fact." 
Dr. Rockwell was not a witness in the case, and, 
"No other conclusion can be reached than 
that the witness was asked and the statement 
made by plaintiff's counsel for the sole purpose 
of getting before the jury a fact which he was 
not entitled to and for the purpose of improperly 
influencing its action." 
See also: 
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Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron \Yorks. 127 N. Y. S. 506: 
Wilkins v. Schwartz. (W. Va.) 132 S. E. 887: 
Fleming v. Hartrick. (\V. Va.) 141 S. E. 628; 
Wiersema v. Lockwood & Strickland Co .• 147 Ill. 
App. 33. 
In each of the California cases of Citti v. Bava, 266 
Pac. 954, Squires v. Riffe, 287 Pac. 360, Rising v. Veatch, 
3 Pac. (2d) 1023, and Schlenker v. Egloff, 24 Pac. (2d) 
224, it was held that the matter of insurance being in-
jected into the case was prejudicial error based upon 
the fact that the attorney for the plaintiff knew or was 
presumed to have known that the answer of the wit-
ness would refer to the matter of insurance, and that 
he intentionally asked the objectionable question for that 
purpose and the fact that the matter was sought to be 
brought in under guise of an admission was no excuse. 
In the Citti case, it was said: 
''The natural tendency of a line of examina-
tion that suggests to the jury that the defendant 
is indemnified against any judgment for damages 
against him is highly prejudicial to his rights, 
especially in a closely balanced case where the 
evidence otherwise would be easily sufficient on 
appeal to support a verdict either for the plain-
tiff or for the defendant. 
"It is impossible for us to state that the jury 
would not have found a different verdict had the 
objectionable examination not taken place and 
the evidence not been admitted." 
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In the Rising case it was said: 
"The courts have so frequently, and in the 
strongest terms, condemned the eliciting of evi-
dence concerning insurance against liability car-
ried by defendants that no excuse can be con-
ceived for counsel bringing it out, and the prac-
tice is so recurrent as to call for the sternest 
measures by both trial and appellate courts when-
ever it occurs." 
In Hankins et al v. Hall, (Okla.) 54 Pac. (2d) 609, 
judgment was reversed where it was brought out through 
questioning a witness that a gentleman from an insurance 
company had taken a statement. 
In Allen v. Wilkerson, (Mo.) 8'7 S. W. (2d) 1056, the 
question was asked: "I want you to state to the jury 
whether or not you signed any report or statement for 
this insurance adjuster who came and talked with you?" 
The court said: 
"Inasmuch as no legitimate purpose could 
be subserved by the development of the insurance 
features and the only effect it could have was that 
it would impress the jurors' minds with the idea 
that the woman defendant was not really inter· 
ested in the outcome of the case and that an 
indemnity insurance company would have to bear 
the loss in any event, it necessarily follows that 
its effect could not be otherwise than harmful to 
the defendant's side of the case." 
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In Trent v. Lechtman Printing Company, (Mo.) 126 
S. W. 238, in cross examination of one of defendant's 
witnesses, counsel in referring to one of defendant's 
attorneys asked: "When he came down, didn't he say 
that he had been sent there by the insurance company 
to investigate the matter?" Judgment reversed. 
In Cameron v. Pacific Lime and Gypsum Company, 
(Ore.) 144 Pac. 446, it was held reversible error where 
there was an intentional effort on counsel's part on cross-
examination, to bring out that a certain statement was 
given to an agent of the insurance company. 
In JVilson v. Wesler, (Ohio) 160 N. E. 863, in cross-
examining a witness, after asking about certain facts 
concerning the accident, counsel asked: "'Didn't you 
report to your Insurance Company that you went 
straight catercornered across that corner?' A. 'No, Sir, 
I did not.' The trial court at that time instructed the 
jury that the question was improper and that they 
should disregard it." In reversing the judgment on appeal 
the court said: 
"The only purpose to which this question 
could have been asked was to have it brought to 
the attention of the jury that an insurance com-
pany was defending the action." 
In Stoskoff v. Wickland, (N. Dak.) 193 N. W. 312, it 
is said: 
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"By objection, the matter was particularly 
called to the attention of the jury. On the other 
hand, a party should not be deprived of his privi-
lege to urge a valid objection because a greater 
prejudice might follow. He should not be sub-
ject to a possible penalty for insisting upon a 
proper regard for his rights. Rather the penalty, 
if penalty there be, should be visited upon the 
real party at fault." 
In Georgeson v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461, it was 
"The situation is one that all too frequently 
arises. A remark is made by counsel, known by 
him to be improper and made with intent and 
expectation that it will improperly influence the 
jury to the advantage of his client and the dis-
advantage of the opposing party. No extraneous 
evidence is needed to establish such intent. If 
such result is not intended, why are such remarks 
made? Objection to the remark of opposing coun-
sel enhances likelihood that the intended effect 
will be produced both by attracting attention to 
it and by invoking a repetition. The remark being 
made, or made and repeated, the intended effect 
is probably produced. * ~" ~" Even a reprimand 
to offending counsel 'does not cure the wrong 
done to litigants' by prejudicial remarks." 
The following cases hold misconduct of counsel in 
questioning or eliciting answers from witnesses injecting 
the matter of insurance directly or indirectly into the case 
during the course of the trial and in the presence of the 
jury is inexcusable and so prejudicial, particularly where 
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there is a conflict in the evidence as to defendant's lia-
bility, as to require a new trial or a reversal of the judg-
ment, and an instruction cannot cure the error. 
JVatson v. Adarru, (Ala.) 65 So. 528; 
Blue Bar Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v. Hudspeth, 
(Ariz.) 216 Pac. 246: 
Fike v. Grant, (Ariz.) 8 Pac. (2d) 242; 
Consolidated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66 
Pac. (2d) 246; 
JVard v. Haralson, (Ark.) 120 S. W. (2d) 322; 
Peay v. Panich, (Ark.) 8? S. W. (2d) 23; 
Niclwls v. Smith, (Cal.) 28 Pac. (2d) 693; 
Citti v. Bava, (Cal.) 266 Pac. 954; 
Squires v. Riffe, (Cal.) 28? Pac. 360; 
Rising v. Veatch, (Cal.) 3 Pac. (2d) 1023; 
Schlenker v. Egloff, (Cal.) 24 Pac. (2d) 224; 
Coe v. VonWhy, (Colo.) 80 Pac 894; 
]ames Stewart & Co. v. Newby, (4th C. C. A.) 266 
Fed. 28?; 
Crossler v. Safeway Stores, (Ida.) 6 Pac. (2d) 151; 
Wiersema v. Lockwood & Strickland Co., 14? Ill. 
App. 33; 
Rudd v. jackson, (Iowa) 213 N. W. 428; 
Rutherford v. Gilchrist, (Iowa) 255 N. W. 516; 
Floy v. Hibbard, (Iowa) 28? N. W. 829; 
Coffman v. Shearer, (Kan.) 34 Pac. (2d) 9?; 
Forsyth v. Church, (Kan.) 42 Pac. (2d) 9?5; 
Star Furniture Co. v. Holland, (Ky.) 11? S. W. 
(2d) 603; 
Poland v. Dunbar, (Maine) 15? Atl. 381; 
Herrin v. Daly, (Miss.) 31 So. ?90; 
Whatley v. Bovlas, (Miss.) 1 ?? So. 1; 
Allen v. Wilkerson, (Mo.) 8? S. W. (2d) 1056; 
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Trent v. Lechtman Printing Company, (Mo.) 126 
s. w. 238; 
Olian v. Olian, (Mo.) 59 S. W. (2d) 673; 
Rytersky v. O'Brine, (Mo.) 70 S. W. (2d) 538; 
Robinson v. McVay, (Mo.) 44 S. W. (2d) 238; 
Vonault v. O'Rourke, (Mont.) 33 Pac. {2d) 535; 
Gerry v. N ewgebauer, (N. H.) 136 Atl. ?'51; 
Young v. Osgood, {N. H.) 163 Atl. 398; 
Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 80 N. Y. 
S. 861; 
Simpson v. Foundation Co., {N. Y.) 95 N. E. 10; 
Chernick v. Independent American Ice Cream Co., 
121 N. Y. S. 352; 
Levy v. ]. L. Mott Iron Works, 127 N. Y. S. 506; 
Hordern v. Salvation Army, 109 N. Y. S. 131; 
Loughlin v. Brassil, (N. Y.) 79 N. E. 854; 
Stoskoff v. Wicklund, (N.D.) 193 N. W. 312; 
Wilson v. Wesler, (Ohio) 160 N. E. 863; 
Hankins v. Hall, (Okla.) 54 Pac. {2d) 609; 
Brotten v. White, (Okla.) 75 Pac. {2d) 4?'4; 
Dolliver v. Lathion, (Okla.) 82 Pac. {2d) 675; 
Rosumny v. Marks, (Ore.) 246 Pac. ?'23; 
Cameron v. Pacific Lime & Gypsum Co., (Ore.) 
144 Pac. 446; 
Ross v. Willamette Valley Transfer Company, 
{Ore.) 248 Pac. 1088; 
Zeller v. Pickovsky, {S. D.) 268 N. W. 729; 
Gose v. Ballard, (Tex.) 12 S. W. {2d) 1067; 
Texas Co. v. Betterton, (Tex.) 88 S. W. (2d) 1038; 
The Fair v. Preisach, (Tex) ?'?' S. W. (2d) 725; 
Water Light and Ice Co. of Weatherford v. Barnett, 
(Tex.) 212 S. W. 236; 
Page v. Thomas, (Tex.) 71 S. W. (2d) 234; 
Beaumont Traction Co. v. Dilworth, (Tex.) 94 S. 
w. 352; 
Carter v. Walker, (Tex.) 165 S. W. 483; 
Roman v. ]. G. Turnbull Co., (Vt.) 131 Atl. 788; 
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Lanham v. Bond, (Va.) 160 S. E. 89: 
Iverson v. McDonnell, (Wash.) 78 Pac. 202: 
JVesley v. w· ashington Brick, Lime & Mmz. Co .. 
(Wash.) 82 Pac. 2'71: 
Birch v. Abercombie, ('Vash.) 133 Pac. 1020; 
Shay v. Horr, ('Vash.) 139 Pac. 604; 
Wilkins v. Schwartz, (W.Va.) 132 S. E. 88'7: 
Atkins v. Bartlett, ('V. Va.) 132 S. E. 885; 
Papke v. Haerle, ('Vis.) 20'7 N. W. 261. 
C. ARGUMENT TO THE JURY 
Wholly outside the record, counsel in his closing 
argument stated: "On the day of the accident, or soon 
thereafter, an investigator or adjuster was out at the 
scene of the accident." (Dft. Ah. 123-124). And still not be-
ing satisfied, he endeavored to tell the jury that the appel-
lant was being defended by an insurance company 
through its counsel by stating: "That the defendant se-
cured an attorney who spends all his time in the defense 
of this class of cases." (Dft. Ah. 123). This was misconduct 
itself sufficient to require a reversal and being coupled 
with misconduct in examination of jurors and ques-
tioning witnesses requires a reversal of this case. 
Wagnon et al v. Brown, (Okla.) 36 Pac. (2d) '723: 
"(3) Assignment 6 is based on the following 
remark of plaintiff's attorney in his closing argu-
ment to the jury: 
" 'I may in my weak way be unable to an-
swer the argument of Mr. Sandlin, and with all 
these other counsel here for the insurance people.' 
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"Counsel for defendants objected to the 
reference to insurance and the objection was sus. 
tained; the court also instructed the jury to dis· 
regard any evidence to which it had sustained 
objection. 
"* ~-: * For reasons which are fully set forth 
in that opinion, we hold that assignment of error 
No. 6 should be sustained. 
"This cause is reversed and remanded for 
new trial." 
In Messinger v. Karg, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 864, it was 
argued to the jury that "she (meaning Mrs. Messinger) 
is just trying to defend herself. Maybe these folks have 
her scared by trying to make her believe she has to 
pay. * * *" The judgment was reversed for misconduct 
of counsel, there being conflicting testimony on the issue 
of negligence in the case, the court pointing out: 
"It might well be that the insurance company 
would have some defense, or as sometimes happens 
in these days, it might prove to be insolvent." 
I 
and thus the responsibility of paying falls on the de· 
fendant personally. 
In Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Brown, (Okla.) 
38 Pac. (2d) 529, where counsel during his argument to 
the jury suggested the defendant might be under bond, 
in reversing the judgment, the court said: 
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"'In a suit for personal InJUries. after the 
jury has been sworn and placed in the jury box. 
no references should be made as to whether or not 
the defendant carried insurance. and if such ref-
erences are made it is reversible error. although 
the trial court instructs the jury not to consider 
the same.' 
"This sort of argument we cannot approve. It 
it not harmless error. It is like a rapier thrust in 
a vital spot and then withdrawing the blade with 
apologies. Lawsuits should he won on their merits, 
and not by ingenious argument fraught with un-
fair assertions sought to procure an unfair advan-
tage over one's adversary based upon propositions 
that in the very nature of things counsel should 
know is not, and could not be, competent testi-
mony in the case. As above stated, neither an 
attorney nor his client should be permitted to 
gain an advantage by such conduct." 
In Ingerich v. Mess. (2nd C. C. A.) 63 Fed. (2d) 233, 
in reversing the judgment for improper argument, it 
was said: 
"(4) In summing up to the jury, the attorney 
for the plaintiff seized the opportunity to say, 'We 
have sued here merely for $5,000.00 for reasons 
which we cannot explain, which we are not per-
mitted to explain;' and, after alluding to the in-
juries the plaintiff had sustained, urging the jury 
to award the full amount sued for, and stating 
that the actual damages sustained were 'many 
thousand more,' to say, in speaking of the defend-
ant, that 'while my friend has been shedding 
crocodile tears for John Mess, this nice boy here, 
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we do not even want a button off his vest.' The 
defendant immediately moved for a mistrial, but 
his motion was denied. Plainly these remarks had 
but one purpose. That was to convey to the jury 
the information that a verdict for the entire ad 
dumnum would be for no more than the amount 
of the insurance carried by the defendant." 
In Standridge v. Martin, (Ala.) 84 So. 266, where 
counsel's argument to the jury was suggestive of insur-
ance, the judgment was reversed, the court saying: 
"Such a subject once lodged in the minds of 
the jury is almost certain to stick in their con-
science and to have its effect upon their verdict, 
regardless of any theoretical exclusion of it by the 
trial judge.'' 
In Edwards v. Earnest, (Ala.) 89 So. 729, plaintiff's 
counsel in argument indirectly by illustration mentioned 
insurance and the fact that a Mr. Trockmorton was in 
the insurance business. There was reversible error and 
the admonitions of the trial judge could not eradicate 
the error. 
The following cases hold misconduct of counsel in 
suggesting directly or indirectly in argument to the jury 
that there is insurance in the case, either alone, or to-
gether with the mentioning of insurance through wit-
nesses or on voir dire examination of jurors, particularly 
where there is a conflict in the evidence on the issue of 
liability, is inexcusable and so prejudicial as to require 
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a new trial or a reversal of the judgment, and an • in-
struction cannot cure the error. 
Standridge v. lllartin, (Ala.) 84 So. 266; 
Edwards v. Earnest, (Ala.) 89 So. 729; 
Pickwick Stage Lines Inc. v. Edwards, (10th C. 
C. A.) 64 Fed. (2d) 758; 
lngerick l.'. 1lless, (2nd C. C. A.) 63 Fed. (2d) 233; 
Volkmann v. Brossman, 129 Ill. App. 182; 
Emery Dry Goods Co. v. DeHart, 130 Ill. App. 244; 
Turner v. Lovington Coal .Uining Co., 156 Ill. App. 
60: 
Briggs v. Golden Cream Dairy, (Ill.) 19 N. E. (2d) 
126; 
Ryan v. Simeons, (Iowa) 229 N. W. 667; 
1VcCornack v. Pickerell, (Iowa) 283 N. W. 899; 
Pool v. Day, (Kan.) 40 Pac. (2d) 396; 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Commonwealth, 
(Ky.) 21 S. W. (2d) 452; 
Easton v. Medema, (Mich.) 224 N. W. 636; 
Bergendahl v. Rabeler, (Neb.) 268 N. W. 459; 
Stanley v. Whiteville Lumber Co., (N. Car.) 114 
S. E. 385; 
1llessinger v. Karg, (Ohio) 192 N. E. 864; 
Wagnon v. Brown, (Okla.) 36 Pac. (2d) 723; 
Harris v. Elliott, (Okla.) 61 Pac. (2d) 1089; 
Leonard v. Stepp, (Okla.) 53 Pac. (2d) 1110; 
Yoast v. Sims, (Okla.) 253 Pac. 504; 
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Brown, (Okla.} 
38 Pac. (2d) 529; 
Burgess v. Germany-Ray-Brown Co., (S. Car.) 113 
S. E. 118; 
Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, (S. Dak.) 280 N. W. 
209; 
Coon v. Manley, (Tex.) 196 S. W. 606; 
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Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Owens, (Tex.) 54 S. W. 
(2d) 848; 
Landry v. Hubert, (Vt.) 13? Atl. 97; 
Rinehart & Dennis Co. Inc. v. Brown, (Va.) 120 
S. E. 269; 
Georgeson v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461. 
IMPROPER INSTRUCTIONS 
I. The court's instruction No. 11 (Dft. Ab. 113) 
legally and practically instructed the jury that appellant, 
Kenneth Butte, was required to drive the automobile 
truck "so that he could avoid injuring anyone or collid-
ing with any person on the highway," that is, so as to 
avoid an accident resulting from any danger that might 
be encountered. Appellant's duty in the operation of 
his automobile was to operate the same in a reasonable 
and prudent manner, so as to avoid injuring any person 
upon the highway and in the exercise of due care, and 
was not to avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any 
person, if such persons were not in the exercise of due 
care, at least unless and until appellant had an opportun-
ity of knowing that such other persons were not exer-
cising due care and at which time an accident could 
then he avoided. Stating it another way, this instruction 
and particularly the language above quoted, and the 
portions particularly excepted to (Dft. Ab. 124) failed 
to take into consideration the right of the defendant to 
assume that all other persons would lawfully use the 
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highway and would exercise reasonable and ordinary 
care until put upon notice to the contrary. 
It is the rule in this jurisdiction and others, that 
one has a right to assume that others using the highway 
will obey the law of the road and exercise ordinary care 
and when two automobiles approach an intersection at 
approximately the same time, the driver on the right 
(having the statutory right of way) has the right to 
assume that the disfavored driver (on the left) will 
obey the law of the road and not approach at an ex-
cessive speed nor dart in front of the other car, but 
will yield the right of way to him, and such driver 
coming into the intersection from the right may proceed 
acting on such assumption until reasonably put on notice 
to the contrary. 
In Ferguson v. Reyrwlds, 52 Utah 583, 1?6 Pac. 26?, 
it was said: 
" * * * The plaintiff had a right to assume 
that the driver of the automobile would exercise 
ordinary care in driving the car. This certainly 
is the law everywhere. No one using a public 
street or being lawfully thereon is required to 
assume otherwise than that all persons using the 
same will exercise ordinary care in doing so and 
will not expose any one on the street to unneces-
sary danger." 
In Williams v. Globe Grain & Milling Company, 64 
Utah 82, 228 Pac. 192, it was held that the plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
approaching from the right, even if the other vehicle 
could or should have been seen "would not alone pre-
clude his recovery, because it would remain for the jury 
to say whether under all the circumstances the plain-
tiff was justified in depending upon defendant's driver 
observing his duty to keep his omnibus under contro] 
and yield the right of way to plaintiff," and it was 
error to direct a verdict in favor of defendant, who had 
approached from plaintiff's left. 
In Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W. 
550, recovery in favor of the plaintiff who was approach-
ing the intersection from the right was sustained as 
against the other driver on this theory, the court say-
ing that the "driver had the right to act on this assump-
tion until a situation was presented which would sug-
gest to ·a reasonable person that the occupants of the 
car were being placed in a position of danger. It then. 
became the duty of the wagon driver to exercise all 
reasonable precaution to avoid a collision." 
In Simon v. Lite Bros. Inc., (Pa.) 10'7 Atl. 635, re-
garding such duty, it was said that he was not "req~ired 
to anticipate and guard against the want of ordinary 
care on the part of another" and "guard against colli-
sion with a car approaching at * * * excessive speed." 
In Richards v. Neault, (Maine) 135 Atl. 524, the 
situation was precisely like that in the instant case, 
there being conflicting testimony on the right of way 
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and speed. A verdict for defendant was sustained. the 
court saying: 
"It would not he unreasonable for the jury to 
conclude. as the defendant testified that he did 
not realize that the Lovioe car was not going to 
stop and give him the right of way until he was 
so near the point of collision that he could not 
avoid it, that he turned his car to the left so far 
as he could and put on his brakes, that he was 
not guilty of negligence in assuming that Lovioe 
would give him the right of way, and that his 
exceeding the statutory limit of speed in no way 
contributed to the accident." 
See also Sliter v. Clark, (Wash.) 220 Pac. ?85; Roe 
v. Kurtz, (Iowa) 210 N. W. 550; and Merrifield v. Hoff-
berger, (Md.) 12? Atl. 500. 
The application of this rule of reasonable reliance 
until put on notice to the contrary would particularly 
apply in the instant case in that there was a store on 
the $.;«;east corner, eighteen feet south of the south 
curb line of Third Avenue (Dft. Ah. 88); that Gerald 
Franz was traveling forty miles per hour, or fifty-nine 
feet per second, and did not even see the Butte truck 
until he was into the intersection (Dft. Ah. 66) and then 
tried to heat it across the intersection. (Dft. Ah. 62). As 
described by Miss Chamberlain, "It shot up in front of 
us." (Dft. Ah. 94). The testimony and the physical facts 
both show that Kenneth Butte, as soon as it was reason-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
62 
ably apparent that the Franz car was not going to yield 
the right of way, did everything possible to avoid a 
collision in applying his brakes and turning to the 
~ight to parallel the cars. (Dft. Ab. 106). In Farrell v. 
Cameron, (Utah) 94 Pac. (2d) 1068, it is pointed out that, 
"it takes .75 seconds for a normal person to act after 
observing danger." Under such circumstances, it would 
be reasonable for the jury to find that before a reason-
ably prudent person in the position of Kenneth Butte, 
in the exercise of ordinary care could observe that Ger-
ald Franz was approaching at an unlawful speed intend-
ing to recklessly usurp the right of way by cutting 
directly in front of defendant's truck, that reasonable 
action on his part could not have avoided the accident. 
In Knutson v. Lurie, (Iowa) 251 N. W. 147, a case 
arising out of an intersection collision, an instruction 
much like that in the instant case was held to erroneous-
ly define the duty of defendant and was reversible error. 
The instruction first stated in general terms that it was 
the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care, 
but added that if there was danger of collision, "it is 
his duty to reduce the speed of his car so * * * he can 
bring his vehicle to a stop and avoid injury." The court 
said that this instruction was erroneous because it re-
quired her to avoid injury "whether a reasonably prud-
ent person could do so or not. * * * Obviously the in-
struction, even when read with the remainder of the 
court's charge was prejudicial." 
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In Loony v. Parker, (Iowa) 230 N. W. 570, an in-
struction requiring the defendant "to maintain such con-
trol of his car as to enable him to stop without hitting 
the car ahead of him" was erroneous as requiring the 
driver to exercise such control as to '"avoid collision 
whether he was negligent or not. .. 
In Gregory v. Suhr, (Iowa) 268 N. W. 14, a new trial 
was properly granted where an instruction had been 
given which tended to impose upon the defendant the 
absolute duty of having his automobile under such con-
trol as to avoid a collision. See also Fry v. Smith, (Iowa) 
253 N. W. 147. 
In Boutelle v. White, (Ga.) 149 S. E. 805, an instruc-
tion among other things requiring defendant to exercise 
"the degree of diligence * * * necessary to avoid in-
juring others" was properly refused as imposing the 
duty of an insurer. And in Giles v. Voiles, {Ga.) 88 S. E. 
207, the giving of an instruction containing the same 
language as in the Boutelle case was held reversible 
error, the court saying: 
"This imposed on defendant the duty of ob-
serving the diligence required of an insurer and 
eliminated all such questions as accident, contri-
butory negligence, and the duty of plaintiff to 
exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences 
of defendant's negligence." 
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In Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, (Wis.) 225 N. W. 
935, it was reversible error to instruct the jury "that it 
is the duty of every driver of a motor car upon the 
highway to keep his automobile at all times under con-
trol, and if he fails to have his car under control he is 
guilty of want of ordinary care." The court said that 
this "imposed an undue burden upon the defendant. The 
duty of Oscar Grandhagen was to exercise ordinary care 
to keep his automobile under control. The instruction im-
posed the absolute duty to keep the automobile under 
control at all times, regardless of the question of whether 
ordinary care was exercised in so doing." 
Instruction No. 11 is further erroneous 1n that it 
attempts to define defendant's duty to pedestrians as 
well as occupants of other vehicles. This is misleading 
in that at an intersection where there is a crosswalk, if 
there is reasonable probability of collision, the pedes-
trian has the right of way over the automobile, (Section 
5'7-'7-35 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933) whereas between 
automobiles the right of way is determined from other 
considerations. In Merrifield v. Hoffberger Co., (Md.) 127 
Atl. 500, it is pointed out that the duty of an automobile 
driver as to pedestrians is different from that of his 
duty to other automobile drivers for two reasons, namely 
(1) the pedestrian would have the right of way at inter-
sections, whereas another automobile might not; (2) be-
cause of the capacity to injure a pedestrian, the duty 
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toward such pedestrian is increased. I ustruction No. 11 
should have eliminated the reference to pedestrians. 
Instruction 11 given by the court was of the utmos\ 
importance and highly prejudicial to the defendant in 
that it erroneously defined to the jury the duty of de-
fendant in the operation of his automobile and had a 
direct hearing on the issue of defendant's negligence. 
Had the jury been properly instructed on the duty of 
defendant, it might well have found from the evidence 
either that the defendant was not negligent or that the 
speed of Gerald A. Franz, his failure to keep a lookout 
and to yield the right of way and his attempt to beat 
defendant's truck across the intersection was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision. 
II. Instruction No. 12 (Dft. Ab. 114) duly excepted 
to by appellant (Dft. Ab. 125) is clearly erroneous and 
prejudicial. The City Ordinance, Section 1382, (Dft. Ab. 
7) is the same ordinance that this court construed in 
the case of State v. Lingman, (Utah) 91 Pac. (2d) 45'7, 
which ordinance was held to be in violation of Section 
57-'7-16, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by 
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, in that the state statute 
provides among other things in substance, that driving 
in excess of twenty-five miles an hour in any residential 
district is prima facie evidence that the speed is not 
reasonable or prudent, and hence unlawful; whilst the 
instruction given based on the ordinance held void in 
the Lingman case provided that "it is unlawful for any 
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person to drive in a vehicle in a residential district in 
excess of twenty-five miles per hour" and that defendant 
was negligent if he exceeded such speed. This instruc-
tion was a clear misstatement of the law and most prej-
udicial to defendant on the issue of negligence, defendant 
being entitled to have the jury correctly instructed on 
the question of unlawful speed. 
III. Instruction No. 14 (Dft. Ab .. 115) duly excepted 
to (Dft. Ab. 125) was improper and misleading in two 
respects; (1) That it failed to define, and the remainder 
of the instructions failed to define, what constituted a 
first entry into the intersection. In other words, under 
such instruction, even though the jury concluded that 
the cars entered the intersection at substantially the 
same time so that if each continued at the same rate of 
speed that an accident would occur, yet, if the Franz 
car entered the intersection one inch ahead of defendant's 
car, or one-one-hundredth of a second before the de-
fendant's car entered the intersection, then it would have 
the right of way, although defendant was approaching 
from the right. Such a construction is a strained and 
unreasonable one and such as would operate to en-
courage drivers approaching an intersection from the 
left to increase speed in an effort to beat the other auto-
mobile approaching from the right by a fraction of a 
second or of an inch, rather than fairly place the respon-
sibility on the driver approaching from the left to yield 
to the driver on the right. (2) That the instruction wholly 
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fails to take into consideration contributory negligence 
on the part of the deceased, but unqualifiedly tells the 
jury that if the defendant failed to yield the right of way 
and such failure was the proximate cause of the injury 
that their verdict should be for plaintiff. There was 
ample evidence to show that the deceased failed to ex-
ercise any care for his own safety. It was stipulated (Dft. 
Ab. 8?') that deceased made no complaint about speed, nor 
warning of the approaching truck driven by appellant, 
and as there was evidence that the Ford V-8 in which 
deceased was riding was traveling in excess of thirty-
five miles an hour across an intersection in a residential 
district, and as there was evidence that the vision to 
the right was unobstructed for a distance of more than 
a block, the jury would have been justified in finding 
that deceased, who was riding on the right side of the 
car with an opportunity to observe the approaching 
truck and appreciate the danger of crossing an inter-
section at such a rate of speed, did not use reasonable 
and ordinary care. The fact that instruction No. 16 
specifically instructed the jury on the issue of contri-
butory negligence of deceased and that most of the 
other instructions took into consideration the same issue, 
but that this instruction did not do so, but placed upon 
the jury the absolute duty of finding for the plaintiff 
regardless of deceased's negligence, makes this instruc-
tion particularly vicious, and authorities hold such erron-
l~ous instruction is reversible error. 
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In Keena v. United R. R. Co. of S. F., (Cal.) 207 
Pac. 35, an instruction like that given in the instant 
case was reversible error in that by its terms it purported 
to settle the conditions necessary to the predication of a 
verdict for plaintiff, but omitted from its consideration 
the issue of contributory negligence, and the fact that 
the court, in other places, had fully instructed the jury 
on the defenses of contributory negligence and its im-
portance in the case, could not and did not cure the 
error, because this merely created a hopeless conflict 
between the instructions, and, therefore, was not capable 
of being harmonized. It was said: 
"In such case it is impossible to determine 
which of the conflicting rules presented to them 
was followed by the jury and the error in any of 
the instructions must be deemed prejudicial." 
The following cases all sustain the same rule: 
Peirce v. United Gas & Elec. Co. (Cal.) 118 Par. 
700; 
Beyerle v. Clift, (Cal.) 209 Pac. 1015; 
Sinan v. Atcheson T. & S. F. R. Co., (Cal.) 284 
Pac. 1041; 
LaRue v. Powell, (Cal.) 42 Pac. (2d) 1063; 
Oklahoma R. Co. v. Milam, (Okla.) 147 Pac. 314: 
Shell Pipe Line Co. v. Robinson, (10th C. C. A.) 
66 Fed. (2d) 861; 
Bauer & johnson Co. v. National Roofing Co., 
(Neb.) 187 N. W. 59; 
Birmingham E. & B. R. Co. v. Hoskins, (Ala.) 39 
So. 338; 
McVey v. St. Clair Co., (W. Va.) 38 S. E. 648. 
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RIGHT OF WAY 
Section 5?-?-31, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pro-
vides: 
"The driver of a vehicle approaching an inter-
section shall yield the right of way to a vehicle 
which has entered the intersection. When two 
vehicles enter an intersection at the same time the 
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield to the 
driver on the right." 
Section 5?-1-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, de-
fined an "intersection" as: 
"The area embraced within the prolongation 
or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, 
then of the lateral boundary lines of two or more 
highways which join one another at an angle, 
whether or not one highway crosses the other." 
The impracticability of this definition as relating 
to the respective rights of way at intersections was ac-
knowledged in that said section was expressly repealed, 
CJ:Iapter 46, Laws of Utah, 1935, and no attempt was 
made to define an intersection in the 1935 laws, nor 
as last amended, Chapter 65 Laws of 1937. In inter-
preting "intersection" therefore, reference must be made 
to the cases and not the statutes. 
The first sentence of Section 5'?-?-31, supra, is simply 
declarative of the common law. In Knox v. North Jersey 
St. Ry. Co., (N. J.) 57 Atl. 423, it is said: "The rule is 
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* ~': * the first to reach the crossing traveling at a rea-
sonable rate of speed has the right to pass first. * * * 
This rule is a part of the common law of the state." In 
.~1 ayer v. Mellette, (Ind.) 114 N. E. 241, as "appellee 
was * * * closer to the intersection than appellant and 
the record disclosing no ordinance or regulation to the 
contrary, appellee apparently had the right of way." 
In Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W. 550, 
supra, it is said that "under the law of the road, defend-
ant's driver, having first entered upon the intersection of 
the two streets, in the absence of some regulation to the 
contrary, had the right of way." See also Yuill v. Berry-
man, (Wash.) 162 Pac. 513; JV. F. ]ahn & Co. v. Paynter, 
(Wash.) 170 Pac. 132; Couchman v. Snelling, (Cal.) 295 
Pac. 845; Page v. Mazzei, (Cal.) 3 Pac. (2d) 11. 
The second sentence of Section 5?-?-31 IS a regu-
lation unknown to the common law, but, like in most 
states, adopted for the purpose of determining precedence 
between vehicles that would otherwise collide. Many 
states in determining the right of way hold that regard 
should be had to the "point of intersection of the auto· 
mobiles" while a few states hold that regard should be 
had to the boundaries of the street or the area within the 
prolongation of the lateral curbs. As above pointed out 
the Utah Legislature expressly revoked the latter defini· 
tion but at any rate, under either view, the authorities 
hold that the rule in determining the right of way is 
one of practical application rather than a matter of frac-
tions of feet or seconds, and that if the cars appear that 
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they will intersect at "approximately" the same time, 
having due regard to the relative speeds and all the 
circumstances, and a collision or interference between 
them is reasonably to be apprehended, then the car 
on the left should yield the right of way. 
In Founier v. linn, (Mass.) 154 N. E. 268, where the 
intersection is treated as the place common to both 
highways and not the intersecting paths of the automo-
biles, the court says as to the duty of the driver from 
the left: 
"Nor could he take the risk of proceeding 
because he was a few feet nearer the intersecting 
point than the defendant and concluded he could 
proceed across the intersection area in time to 
avoid a collision." 
And in· Neumann v. Apter, (Conn.) 112 Atl. 350, 
where "intersection" is similarly defined, the term "ar-
riving at such intersection at approximately the same 
instant" is to he interpreted such that "the driver of an 
automobile approaching the intersection * * * must 
when an automobile is approaching such intersection 
from his right give such approaching automobile the right 
to cross the intersection before him, if a man of ordinary 
prudence in his situation in the exercise of due care 
would reasonably believe that if the two automobiles 
continued to run at the rate of speed at which they are 
then running, such continuance of their course would 
involve the risk of a collision." 
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In Roe v. Kurtz, (Iowa) 210 N. W. 550, it is said: 
"Regard will not be had to fractions of seconds." In 
Weber v. Gruenbaum Co., (Pa.) 113 Atl. 413, there should 
be "a substantial distance." In Schumann v. Hall, 219 N. 
Y. S. 228, the court said that the right of way rule ap-
plies where "the relative distances and speeds are not 
materially unequal." In Ray Mead Co., Inc. v. Products 
Mfg. Co., 180 N. Y. S. 641, it was held that an instruc-
tion should not be confined to mere distances. And in 
Shirley v. Larkin Co., (N. Y.) 145 N. E. ?51, it was said: 
"Neither ~" * ~·: is the statute to be interpreted 
as meaning that the driver of a car limited by 
subordinate rights may go forward to the point of 
intersection because a hasty and unreliable com-
putation seems to indicate that he is a few feet 
nearer the point of intersection than the car on 
his right, and that, therefore, he possibly might 
be able to dash across the line of the latter and 
escape a collision. The rule of construction must 
be guided by reason and common sense, and if 
it appears that the relative positions of the two 
cars, taking into account distances from the point 
of intersection and speed, is such that damage of 
a collision may reasonably be apprehended, if 
the car on the left proceeds, it is the duty of its 
driver to slow up or stop and give the car on 
the right the precedence which is guaranteed by 
the statute." 
In Collins v. Liddle, 6? Utah 242, 24? Pac. 4?6, the 
rule was stated as follows: 
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.. If under the circumstances of the case the 
relative situation of the parties and the speed at 
which they are driving are such that a eollision 
is reasonably to be apprehended. then, as we un-
derstand the law, it is the dutv of the driver on 
the left to yield the right of ~\?ay to the driver 
on the right. This interpretation of the meaning 
of statutes and ordinances, in substance, the same 
as the Utah statute, finds support among both 
text-writers and adjudicated cases. An instruc-
tion to that effect is quoted with approval in 
Bryant v. Bingham Stage Line, 60 Utah, at page 
309. 208 P. 541." 
I 
And it was held erroneous to use the word "immenent" 
in place of the words "reasonably to be apprehended." 
In Golden Eagle Dry Goods Co. v. Mockbee, (Colo.) 
189 Pac. 850, an instruction similar to instruction No. 14 
given in the instant case was held erroneous and revers-
ible error in that such instruction fails to take into con-
sideration the point of possible collision and other prac-
ticable considerations. The court said: 
"The instruction is impracticable because, in 
many cases in which collision is likely, when two 
machines are near enough to know that they will 
reach the street intersection simultaneously, it is 
too late to consider the question of right of way. 
"Again, the instruction requires every driver 
to look both right and left to see whether any of 
the cars on either side will touch the street inter-
section before or with him, an impracticable task. 
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"We think the right rule is that it is the 
duty of every driver when approaching a street 
intersection to use reasonable care to see whether 
there is likelihood of collision with any car ap-
proaching from the right, and, if there is, to yield 
to it the right of way, and to keep his car under 
such control that he can do so. Livingstone v. Bar-
ney, 62 Colo. 528, 163 Pac. 863; Colo., etc., Ry. Co. 
v. Cohun, 180 Pac. 307." 
We submit that Instruction 14 erroneously stated 
the rule of right of way and erroneously excluded as a 
condition essential to recovery the issue of plaintiff's 
contributory negligence and was reversible error. 
IV. Instruction No. 15 (Dft. Ab. 116) excepted to 
(Dft. Ab. 125) is confusing and would certainly mis-
lead the jury. It in substance told the jury that if the 
defendant was negligent, that the negligence of Gerald 
Franz, with whom deceased was riding, would not con-
stitute a defense. If both cars were negligently driven, 
the jury upon a proper presentation of the law could 
well have found that the negligence of Gerald Franz 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. As for 
example, appellant in driving west on Third Avenue 
could have been driving two miles an hour in excess of 
the speed limit, which might constitute negligence. On 
the other hand, Gerald Franz, with whom deceased was 
riding might under the evidence have been driving north 
on K Street forty miles an hour, with a failure to yield 
the right of way to appellant's car first entering from 
the right. In such event, both might be negligent, and 
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yet the jury could have properly found that the sole 
proximate cause was the negligence of Gerald Franz. 
and that the accident would still have occurred even had 
appellant been driving less than twenty-five miles an 
hour. In view of the evidence the effect of this instruc-
tion was to lead the jury to believe that it should pay 
no attention to the negligence, if any, of Franz, and in 
effect made the defendant liable regardless of the ques-
tion of proximate cause. Bennett v. Robertson, (Vt.) t'l'l 
Atl. 625. Cases are hereafter cited to the effect that negli-
gence is not always the proximate cause of the accident. 
V. Instruction No. 1?' (Dft. Ah. 11?') excepted to 
{Dft. Ab. 125) is erroneous for the same reason that In-
struction No. 14 was erroneous and constituted such a 
duplication of that erroneous rule as to place undue em-
phasis upon it. As pointed out in the exception 
(Ab. 126) it undertook to lay down an impracticable rule 
by leaving it up to the drivers of automobiles approach-
ing intersections at such speeds that they would travel 
thirty-six feet a second and could not apply brakes before 
traveling from the curbline to the center of the inter-
section before determining which one should yield the 
right of way. In other words, no responsibilty would 
be placed upon the driver from the left to determine that 
he should yield until he first discovered upon entering 
the intersection whether he was first there by a foot or 
an inch, and at that time it would he too late to avoid 
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an accident and he would undoubtedly "attempt to beat 
the other car across." 
It fails to define what is meant by an "intersec-
tion" and leaves that to the speculation of the jury. 
The ins~.u. .. ctwn as given suggests that one may 
absolutely rely on the right of way and the assumption 
that the other drivers will proceed in a lawful manner 
and yield such right of way and fails to consider that 
one cannot rely on due care of others after reasonably 
put on notice to the contrary. Bullock v. Luke, (Utah) 
yet unreported; St. Mary's Academy of Sisters of L. v. 
Newhagen, (Colo.) 238 Pac. 21. 
Like Instruction No. 14, it purports to lay down 
a formula under which the jury's verdict must be for 
the plaintiff, but wholly fails to take into consideration 
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This 
creates an irreconcilable conflict in the instructions and 
was itself reversible error. 
INSTRUCTIONS DENIED 
I. The court erred in refusing to give appellant's 
requested instruction No. 7 (Dft. Ab. 117) excepted to 
(Dft. Ab. 126). Such a request was proper on defendant's 
theory of the case and might have removed some of the 
objections to Instructions 11 and 15. As already pointed 
out, a speed on the part of defendant of one or five 
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might constitute negligence, and yet such speed might 
well have no relation to the cause of the accident. Assum-
ing appellant was traveling thirty miles an hour, and that 
Gerald Franz, approaching from the lpf+ was traveling 
forty miles an hour, failed to see app ~~-- ... .\until he was 
at or near the center of the intersection and failed to 
yield the right of way, certainly appellant's excessive 
speed of either two or five miles an hour would not 
have changed the ultimate result, but only the exact 
point of contact between the two cars. Under such cir-
cumstances, appellant might have struck the Franz car 
at another point or appellant might have turned more 
sharply and hit it in the same place, but certainly rea-
sonable jurors or judges under such circumstances could 
well conclude that the sole proximate cause was the neg-
ligence of Franz. Appellant was entitled to have the 
jury instructed on that theory. 
Speed was held not a proximate cause of the col-
lision in Wallace v. Yellow Cab Co., 238 Ill. App. 283, 
and Geitzenauer v. johnson, (Wash.) 297 Pac. 174, and in 
Balvoll v. Pinnow, (Wis.) 208 N. W. 466, plaintiff's neg-
ligence was held to not be a proximate cause of the col-
lision. Cases are hereafter cited in which the jury could 
find that the failure io yield the right of way was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. 
II. Appellant's request No. 13 (Dft. Ab. 119) ex-
cepted to (Dft. Ab. 127) should have been given on his 
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theory of the case, as shown by the evidence, it appearing 
that Gerald Franz, had he looked to the right upon ap-
proaching the intersection, would necessarily have seen 
appellant's truck approaching and its speed, and at 
that time the said Gerald Franz could have avoided the 
accident. Under such circumstances, he would have had 
a duty to avoid an accident to be reasonably apprehended 
and his failure to do so might under the evidence con-
stitute the sole proximate cause of the accident. Under 
similar circumstances the jury was held justified in so 
finding in Bryant v. Bingham Stage Lines Company, 
60 Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541. In Collins v. Liddle, 67 Utah 
242, 247 Pac. 476, and W illia~ns v. Globe Grain and Mill-
ing Company, 64 Utah 82, 228 Pac. 192, the matter of 
whether defendant failed to yield the right of way and 
whether such failure was the sole proximate cause was 
for the jury. Failure to yield the right of way was the 
sole proximate cause as a matter of law in Boerner v. 
Wiemann, (Minn.) N. W., yet unreported, and Barrett v. 
Alamito Dairy Co., (Neb.) 181 N. W. 550. These author-
ities sustain defendant's right to have this and other 
instructions presented to the jury on the theory set forth 
in each request and justified by the evidence that the 
negligence, if any, of defendant was not a proximate 
cause of the accident and that the negligence of Franz 
was the sole proximate cause. 
III. The court erred in refusing to give appel-
lant's requested Instruction 14 (Dft. Ab. 119) excepted 
to (Dft. Ab. 127), or in fact any proper instruction on 
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unavoidable accidents. The evidence presents several 
theories upon which this accident could be considered 
unavoidable. and it was error to refuse such instruction. 
The following cases hold that the issue of unavoid-
able accident is raised when there is evidence tending 
to prove that the injury resulted from some cause other 
than the negligence of the parties, as when there is evi-
dence that the negligence of some other party is the sole 
cause thereof, or that the accident was unavoidable so 
far as the defendant was concerned, and it is reversible 
error to refuse an instruction on unavoidable accident. 
}ones v. Nugent, (La.) 166 So. 193; National Cash Register 
Company v. Rider, (Tex.) 24 S. W. (2d) 28; Dallas R. R. 
Co. v. Spear, (Tex.) 299 S. W. 507; Dallas R. Co. v. Brown, 
(Tex.) 97 S. W. (2d) 335; Orange & N. W. R. Co. v. Harris, 
(Tex.) 59 S. W. (2d) 217; Tyler v. Wilhite, (Okla.) 222 
Pac. 997; Alabama Products Company v. Smith, (Ala.) 
141 So. 674. 
IV. The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
request 15 (Dft. Ab. 120) excepted to (Dft. Ab. 127). This 
instruction was appropriate on appellant's theory of the 
case and was not covered by the court's instructions. A 
similar instruction was held appropriate in Bryant v. 
Bingham Stage Line Co., 60 Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541. 
V. Appellant's requested Instruction No. 18 (Dft. 
Ab. 120) refusal to give being excepted to (Dft. Ab. 127) 
properly set forth the nature of the observation legally 
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required of Gerald Franz. This was important because 
Gerald Franz first testified that he did not see appel-
lant's truck until he was about in the center of the 
intersection, and in any event, until he was entering 
the intersection, when it affirmatively appeared that at 
a distance 17 feet south of the south curbline of Third 
Avenue a driver had a clear vision east on Third Avenue 
for more than a block. Had the jury been properly in-
structed as to the type of observation required of a driver, 
it could well have found that Gerald Franz, with whom 
deceased was riding, could and should have seen the ap-
proaching truck in ample time to stop his car and avoid 
the collision. In Bromley v. Dillworth, 274 Fed. 267, the 
rule of lookout is stated as follows: "He was not only 
required to look, but he must look in such an intelligent 
and careful manner as will enable him to see the things 
which a person in the exercise of ordinary care and 
caution for his own safety and the safety of others would 
have seen under like circumstances." Defendant was en-
titled to this requested instruction defining to the jury 
a proper lookout and which clearly presented defend-
ant's theory justified by the evidence that the failure 
of Gerald Franz to keep a proper lookout was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Defendant was entitled to have his case submitted 
to the jury on any theory justified by his evidence, 
and refusal of a proper instruction, which is requested 
on a material issue, on defendant's theory of the evi· 
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denc~ affects defendant's substantial rights and is re; 
versible error. 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Line Co., ?5 Utah 8?, 
283 Pac. 160; 
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac. 
522; 
Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 5? Utah?, 169 
Pac. 868; 
Pate v. Smith, (Okla.) 261 Pac. 189; 
Atcheson T. & S. F. R. Co., v. Ridley, (Okla.) 249 
Pac. 289; 
Smith v. Lenzi, ? 4 Utah 362, 2?9 Pac. 893. 
Assignment of Error No. 6 
The court erred in erroneously permitting plain-
tiff's counsel to read from a deposition not offered or re-
ceived in evidence. 
It is fundamental that arguments of counsel must 
be confined to the evidence and counsel should never 
be permitted to argue anything on which no proof 
has been made on the trial. 
In Dew v. Reid, (Ohio) 40 N. E. '2'18, it was held 
reversible error for the court to permit counsel in his 
argument to the jury to read from a deposition which 
had not been put in evidence. 
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ERRORS IN RULINGS ON THE EVIDENCE 
As assignments of error 28 and 31 also relate to 
prejudicial misconduct of counsel, we will discuss these 
first. 
Assignment of Error No. 28 
Counsel elicited the prejudicial fact from his own 
witness, Gerald Franz, that his claim against the defend-
ant "was taken care of," and then the trial court doubly 
emphasized this matter by having the question and 
answer read over defendant's objection in the presence of 
the jury. This was prejudicial error. 
As the policy of the law encourages the settlement 
of legal controversies, settlements or offers of compro-
mise are not to be brought into the case. "This salutary 
rule," it is said in 2 R. C. L., page 418, "which is grounded 
upon considerations of public policy, absolutely forbids 
that the making of such an offer shall be mentioned or 
commented upon by counsel in argument to the jury. 
When it is, unless it shall clearly appear from the record 
in the particular case that the verdict of the jury was 
not affected, the misconduct is such as to require that 
a new trial be granted." 
In McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah 180, 99 Pac. 660, 
it was held that where evidence of a compromise had 
come into the case, it was reversible error, the court 
saying: 
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"We are of the opinion, therefore, that, in 
view of the record, the court erred in admitting· 
the evidence. A jury is very apt to seize upon 
such an offer as an admission of liability upon 
the part of one making it, when the law does not 
authorize such offers to be considered for that 
purpose." 
In Toledo St. L. & JV. R. Co. v. Burr & ]eakle, 
(Ohio) 92 N. E. 2"!, it was prejudicial error where plain-
tiff's counsel in his argument mentioned an offer of 
settlement. 
,In Demara v. R. I. Co., (R. 1.) 10"! Atl. 89, a judg-
ment was reversed for similar reasons where the testi-
mony on the issue of liability was conflicting. 
Assignment of Error No. 31 
Counsel's question in the form it was put to the 
witness, Norma Chamberlain, being calculated to call 
the attention of the jury to a criminal proceeding against 
Kenneth Butte and thus arouse the prejudice of the jury 
against him, was reversible error in that it denied to the 
defendant a fair trial. 
In Burbank v. Mcintyre, (Cal.) 2"! Pac. (2d) 400, an 
intimation on the part of counsel for the plaintiff of con-
viction of the defendant was held to be reversible error 
in that it undoubtedly had the effect of influencing the 
feelings of the jury, the court saying: 
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"We believe the general admonition of the 
court to the jury to disregard the statements of 
counsel and the testimony stricken out cannot 
offset the damaging effect of its erroneous admis-
sion or its prejudicial effect upon the jury." 
Assignment of Error No. 26 
It was error for the court to permit Officer Hop-
kins to testify as to conditions of visibility on the corner 
uf the accident in the absence of a showing that such 
conditions of visibility were the same then as at the 
time of the accident. 
In Billingsley v. Gulick, (Mich.) 233 N. W. 225, when 
an accident had occurred at twelve o'clock at night, 
it was reversible error to permit a witness to testify that 
early the next morning at the scene of the accident, there 
was a pool of blood on the gravel at the side of the pave· 
ment and a deep depression in the gravel for about thirty 
feet from the south to the pool of blood, without affirma-
tive proof that there had been no change of conditions 
after the accident. 
In Trask v. Boston & M. R. R., (Mass.) 106 N. W. 1022, 
it was held a witness could not testify as to the dazzling 
effect on one's vision of an arc light near the scene of the 
accident, it not being shown that the conditions were the 
same as those on the night of the accident. 
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Assignment of Error No. 2? 
This assignment relates to the improper sustaining 
of a question asked Officer Hopkins on cross examina-
tion. The witness was making an investigation after the 
accident for the purpose of fL""(:ing responsibility as shown 
by the positions of the automobiles and the tire and 
other markings on the highway. Franz had testified that 
his car stopped in the middle of K Street, near the north 
part of the intersection and had denied driving his car 
up to the tree across the lawn, and backing it down off 
the curbing. He had pointed out to the officer that that 
was where the car stopped and such matters had been 
gone into with the witness on direct examination. The 
matter was material in at least three particulars: (1) De-
fendant was entitled to develop on cross examination 
whether Officer Hopkins' testimony and conclusions 
were based solely on his own knowledge and observa-
tions or on what he was told by Franz or others who 
were present at the time of the accident, particularly 
in the determination of whether the markings and physi-
cal surroundings testified to by him had any connection 
with this accident. (2) The matter was certainly material 
in connection with the question of speed, in ascertain-
ing as to how the Franz car plowed up the grass on the 
parking, proceeded north forty-five feet to the big tree 
and then returned to K Street, as indicating the car had 
been driven with such speed and force as to hit the tree 
and bounce back into the street. (3) If Franz drove his 
car off the highway and then told the officers that it 
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stopped in the middle of the street after the accident, 
such false statement would go to the credibility of 
Franz and would aid the jury in determining the facts 
on which to predicate liability or non-liability. 
Assignment of Error No. 29 
On cross-examination, in view of the testimony pre· 
viously. given and the statement that Franz attempted 
to beat the Butte car across the intersection, it was 
proper to question Franz as to his knowledge of his duty 
to yield the right of way as going to the probability of his 
having failed to yield the right of way and also as bearing 
upon his credibility. "The possession of the right of way by 
one of two motorists colliding at an intersection is a ma-
terial factor in determining the relative degree of care re-
quired." 9 Blashfield, Sec. 6199, page 501, and "it is always 
permissible to elicit facts on cross examination of witnesses 
which would tend * * * in any manner to discredit 
their testimony." 9 Blashfield, Sec. 6298, page 5?'4. 
Assignment of Error No. 30 
The sustaining of the objection to the question on 
c,oss-examination concerning income was error. The 
matter of damages had been gone into by plaintiff and 
defendant was entitled on cross-examination to go into 
that matter in full. Plaintiff could not recover anything 
but compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary 
loss suffered. This was dependent upon how much plain-
tiff himself was earning, how -much deceased was earn-
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ing, and how much Paul and Pete were earning and con-
tributing to plaintiff's support or would likely have con-
tributed in the future~ thus relieving deceased from con-
tributing~ had deceased survived. This was of particular 
importance because of the admission of plaintiff that de-
ceased had agreed to assist him financially only until the 
next older boys, Paul and Pete, were working. The jury 
was entitled to know all of these facts and circumstances, 
including the family income, in determining what de-
ceased would have contributed to plaintiff had he sur-
vived and the exclusion of this material evidence was 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant 
on the issue of damages. 
Assignments of Error No. 32 and 33 
The only objection to the questions asked here was 
that they called for the conclusion of the witness. In 
Penton v. Penton, (Ala.) 135 So. 481, it was held the 
driver of a car could testify she had the car under con-
trol as against the contention that it was objectionable 
as being a conclusion. Certainly asking the driver if 
from a certain point he did everything that he thought 
he could do in that instant in an effort to avoid the acci-
dent much less calls for a conclusion of the witness. 
Certainly the question of which car reached a point 
first is not a conclusion, but is a fact testified to by the 
witness and is a proper fact to be brought out, particularly 
where the right of way was so important as in this case. 
9 Blashfield, Sec. 6199, supra. 
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NEW TRIAL 
By Assignment of Error No. 25 appellant complains 
of the trial court denying his motion for a new trial. All 
the points urged on the new trial have heretofore been 
argued and reference thereto is made in support of this 
assignment. 
CONCLUSION 
The questions presented by the assignments of 
error, argument and authorities cited will in our opinion 
make necessary the setting aside of the verdict on the 
second trial. Error was committed on account of mis-
conduct of counsel, rulings on evidence, improper instruc-
tions, improperly refusing requested instructions, im-
proper examination of jurors, and improper argument 
to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence. 
Two vitally important and fundamental questions 
are squarely presented to this court. The first is import-
ant if the jury system is to have any legal foundation, 
and the second, if the law is to provide for the fair and 
impartial trial of cases. If a court can disregard a jury's 
verdict when it is clearly justified by the evidence, then 
we should abolish the jury system. If trials should not be 
conducted in a fair and legal manner, then we should 
abolish the courts and hand the settlement of disputes 
to lay boards or commissions unlearned in the law and 
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having the norma~ prejudices of those interested in tht~ 
result. 
The evidence in this case, in view of the pleadings, 
with no positive showing of actual pecuniary loss, 
would have justified a verdict of $10.00. The evidence 
relating to liability would have sustained a no cause 
of action verdict. Two jurors upon the second trial held 
out against a plaintiff's verdict. The plaintiff's evidence 
showed a willingness on the part of plaintiff to make it 
appear, contrary to the facts, that deceased was his sole 
support. The jury would have been justified in disbe-
lieving and disregarding all of plaintiff's evidence relat-
ing to damage and could have ret~ned a purely nominal 
verdict. 
We believe the trial court in granting the new trial 
erroneously assumed that because a plaintiff's verdict 
was returned in a death case that a substantial verdict 
was necessary. We believe the trial court without regard 
to questionable liability erroneously assumed that he 
had an unlimited discretion. We believe the trial court 
disregarded the legal limitations placed upon his right 
to exercise a sound discretion and permitted his "feelings" 
to overcome his judgment and persuade him to act con-
trary to the duties imposed upon a trial court under the 
constitution and statutes of our state. 
The entire record is before this court. That record, 
in our opinion, clearly sustains the first verdict and 
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clearly impeaches the second. The court's action in grant-
ing a new trial has placed an unjustified, unnecessary 
and undue burden upon the defendant. This court at 
this first opportunity should set aside the second ver-
dict, reinstate the first and end this litigation. 
While we are satisfied that a retrial of this action 
will not be necessary or permitted, the record upon the 
second trial is such as to call upon this court to settle 
questions of trial practice and procedure that have 
caused trouble and will continue to cause trouble until 
definitely and clearly settled. Deliberate, premeditated, 
intentional and prejudicial misconduct was in effect 
ratified and approved on the second trial. This should 
not pass the censure of this court. Other errors were 
committed and should be pointed out for the benefit of 
both court and counsel. 
We respectfully submit that the order granting a 
new trial should be vacated, that the second verdict 
should be set aside, and the verdict on the first trial 
reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH T. STEWART, 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant, Kenneth Butte. 
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